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THE STRUCTURE OF TORTS 
THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR.* 
"In the particular is contained the universal." James Joyce' 
ABSTRACT 
Tort law consists of a number of different causes of action which are seemingly unrelated 
except that all involve civil wrongs, other than mere breaches of contract. The various torts 
have different elements; some, like the nominate or intentional torts, very specific; others, like 
negligence, more general and vague. There is no apparent, coherent, or consistent structure 
applicable to all torts. This Article articulates just such a unified structure for all torts: one 
that arises out of and is based upon the elements of negligence. All torts involve the judicial 
delineation of the defendant's duty or legal obligation. All torts require the factfinder to decide 
if the defendant satisfied or breached that legal obligation. All torts involve a question of 
factual cause, or cause-in-fact, and, there is always an actual, or muted, consideration of legal 
cause. Finally, the factfinder considers and, if appropriate, awards damages-unless the 
plaintiff seeks some alternative remedy, in which case the judge may decide the remedial 
question. After articulating the structure, this Article applies it to a number of torts products 
liability, absolute liability, defamation, and battery. Through the process of articulating and 
applying the structure, it becomes clear that there are legal questions involving the precise 
scope and extent of the defendant's duty or legal obligation within all of the various elements. 
This Article makes those issues plain and emphasizes that they are really questions of the 
defendant's duty. 
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I. THE LABYRINTH, THE MINOTAUR, AND TORTS 
Minos was involved in a struggle with his brothers to become the 
sole ruler of the Island of Crete. He prayed to Poseidon for assistance 
and, sympathetically, the Sea God sent Minos a beautiful Cretan bull 
to help Minos in his struggles. After successfully claiming the throne, 
rather than sacrificing the bull, Minos kept it. Enraged, Poseidon 
caused Minos' wife, Pasiphae, to fall in love with the bull. Their union 
resulted in the birth of the minotaur, Asterion. The minotaur had the 
head of a bull and the body of a human, and it ate only humans. After 
consulting the oracle at Delphi, Minos had the famous architect and 
inventor, Daedalus, construct a labyrinth to serve as the home of the 
monster. 
Later, after the accidental death of his son during a competition in 
Athens, Minos attacked the Athenians. The price of peace was an 
agreement that each year Athens would send fourteen young men and 
women to Crete to be sacrificed to the minotaur. One year, in order to 
rid the Athenians of the curse, Theseus, the son of King Aegeus, vol-
unteered to be one of the fourteen in order to confront and kill the min-
otaur. With assistance from Minos' daughter, Ariadne; a ball of thread; 
and his sword, Theseus slew the minotaur and escaped Crete, saving 
Athens from Minos and the minotaur.2 
The stories in torts, like the narratives in many Greek myths, are 
compelling-the facts of the cases draw the reader into legal and hu-
man dramas. There is Mrs. Palsgraf; there are Summers and Tice;4 
there are people tragically killed or injured by exposure to asbestos 
and other dangerous products;5 there is the fettered mule in Davies v. 
Mann;6 there are Sullivan, the ministers, and the New York Times;7 
there is Larry Flynt thumbing his nose at the late Reverend Falwell.8 
The stories are fabulous. In the law, they attain almost mythic propor-
tion, like the story of Theseus defeating the minotaur. In many in-
stances, the stories9 drive the law. 
While the stories are compelling, as one digs into the law of torts, 
one finds a confusing, less compelling, combination of elements and 
2. The story has more bends and tragedy than provided in this short summary. Minotaur, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Minotaur [https://perma.cc/ 
W278-XFWF]. 
3. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
4. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 1-2 (Cal. 1948). 
5. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997). 
6. Moseley v. Motteux (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 588, 588. 
7. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964). 
8. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 47 (1988). 
9. The stories are what lawyers call the "facts." 
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inconsistencies. One confronts what the law student may conceive of 
as a labyrinth of rules and concepts. There are nominateo torts-those 
with names like assault,n battery, 12 false imprisonment,1 3 and tres-
pass. 14 These nominate torts have what appear to be relatively precise 
elements. Then, there is negligence, which provides that one must act 
reasonably, and this tort has four or five rather broad elements. 
Things get more complex and varied with products liability, absolute 
liability for engaging in abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous ac-
tivities, defamation,1 6 and others. As the lawyer" steps back, she may 
wonder if all the torts are related, other than merely all being civil 
wrongs rather than pure breaches of contract. She may wonder if there 
is a way to tie all the branches of tort law together in a more coherent 
manner. 
In fact, the subject of torts resembles the Cretan labyrinth with nei-
ther apparent order nor consistent analytical path. Adding to the con-
fused nature of the subject, the role of the judge and of the jury in tort 
cases is not always clear. In negligence, it is often said that the judge 
decides duty and the jury decides breach, causation, and damages, but 
is that accurate?18 Is there no law or role for the judge besides deciding 
duty? In fact, there is a key role for the judge beyond the traditional 
duty analysis because much of what the law of torts treats under the 
subjects of breach, causation, and damages are actually legal matters. 
These legal matters and decisions are important statements about the 
scope of the defendant's legal obligation to the plaintiff. By treating 
10. Nominate, BLACK'SLAw DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
11. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 10, at 43 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 
5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON]. 
12. Id. § 9, at 39. 
13. Id. § 11, at 47. 
14. Id. §§ 13-14, at 67, 85. 
15. There are four elements if one considers them to be duty, breach, causation-broken 
down into two sub-elements, cause-in-fact and proximate cause-and damages. There are 
five if each of the causation sub-elements is treated as separate elements. Compare id. § 30, 
at 164 (listing four elements of negligence, coupling cause-in-fact with proximate or legal 
cause), with DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 124 (2018) (ebook) (listing five ele-
ments of negligence, with cause-in-fact and proximate or legal cause listed as independent 
elements). 
16. Defamation is a nominate tort; i.e., it has a name but did not arise out of the writ of 
trespass, and the constitutional overlay discussed below makes it different altogether. See 
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, § 37.2, at 938. 
17. The statement in text may be particularly apt for the law student, especially the 
first-year law student. 
18. See Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 73 (1956); 
see also PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 37, at 235 (stating that "the court must 
decide questions of law, and the jury questions of fact"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 6 (AM. LAW INST. 2005) ("An actor whose neg-
ligence is a factual cause of physical harm is subject to liability for any such harm within the 
scope of liability, unless the court determines that the ordinary duty of reasonable care is 
inapplicable." (emphasis added)). Id. § 7. 
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them as issues of breach or causation or damages, the law obscures 
both their true nature as law and the role of the judge in articulating 
and developing that law. These questions are really part of the defend-
ant's duty to the plaintiff. A duty defines conduct or behavior that ex-
poses someone to liability.'9 Duty also defines the scope of liability; or 
in other words, it asks how far does the obligation extend and to what 
types of injuries? In essence, anything that goes into formulating a 
jury instruction explaining an element is law. Jury instructions are 
judicial statements of law or legal obligations. 
A unified, analytical structure would help to clarify the overall law 
of torts-as well as make it more consistent and understandable. Is 
there a structure to the law of torts that ties all torts together and that 
would logically unify the subject? Is there an analytical and thematic 
method of organization? To be truly helpful, such a structure would also 
need to help clarify the proper role for judge and jury. Is there a meta-
phorical Theseus willing to kill the monstrous part of the subject? 
Identifying, articulating, and applying an overall structure for and 
to tort law would help it all make sense. It would help the citizenry 
see, understand, and comment on this most important private law sub-
ject. After all, torts is one of those critical places in the law where so-
ciety determines appropriate levels of acceptable risk. It is where de-
terrence, compensation, punishment, efficiency, risk spreading, and 
fairness all merge to generate social policy. 20 
This Article establishes that there is indeed a structure of tort law 
with the power to clarify and explain the substance of the law of torts, 
as well as the appropriate roles of the judge and jury. The structure is 
my Theseus; it is an overarching analytical structure stretching across 
all torts. The structure tames, rather than kills, the monster and pro-
vides a comprehensive, consistent basis for understanding all torts. 
Such structure is based on the elements of negligence-duty, breach, 
causation (actual and proximate or legal), and damages (or remedy), 
and it presents a clear model for decisionmaking in torts cases. The 
main analytic elements of negligence reify the basic structure of all 
tort law. Thus, the structure set forth in this Article has application 
to, and provides a consistent analytical approach for, all torts. For each 
"separate" family of torts-intentional torts, negligence, products lia-
bility, etc.-there is a question of duty, a question of breach, a question 
of causation, 2 1 and a question of damages or remedy. If the plaintiff 
seeks alternative or additional relief, such as an injunction, the issue 
19. See Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003). 
20. See Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1161 (La. 1988); see also 
PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 4, at 20. 
21. There is always a question of cause-in-fact; the extent to which there are questions 
of legal or proximate cause may vary a bit as discussed below. See infra Part III.C-III.D. 
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would include the appropriateness of that remedy. More commonly, 
though, the plaintiff seeks damages, thus this Article will focus on 
damages as the fifth element of the structure of torts. 
The description of the model also makes clear that while it is often 
said that the judge decides duty and the jury decides breach, causa-
tion, and damages, in fact every tort, regardless of its categorization, 
involves multiple questions of law. These legal questions are for the 
judge to determine. The judge's legal determinations touch on each el-
ement in the structure. Many "legal" aspects of breach, causation, and 
damages are actually questions or subsidiary questions of the scope of 
the obligation or the scope of the duty.22 This Article makes clear that 
law is infused in every element of every tort as currently conceived and 
that the law is articulated and developed by judges. 23 Critically, even 
if courts articulate the applicable legal rule as part of the discussion of 
breach, causation, or damages, the law is still essentially a part of the 
court's definition of the extent of the defendant's legal obligation to the 
plaintiff.24 
The structure of torts set forth herein makes clear that almost all 
categorical decisions beyond the purely case-specific level are policy 
questions for the judge. They are questions of the scope of the obliga-
tion or duty. When unveiled as legal questions, the allocation of deci-
sionmaking responsibility between judge and jury becomes clearer and 
very basic-judges articulate the law; jurors apply that law to the 
facts. 
In summary, this Article contends that there is a broad, overarch-
ing structure for all tort law; that structure is based on the elements 
of negligence. For every tort, there is a duty issue: what is the legal 
obligation owed? There is a decision about breach: did the defendant 
22. For instance, whether someone is liable for medical-monitoring damages is often 
analyzed as a damages issue; but in reality, it is an issue of the scope of the defendant's duty. 
See, e.g., Baker v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 232 F. Supp. 3d 233, 240-42 
(N.D.N.Y. 2017); see also infra Part III.E. 
23. The factfinders apply the facts to the principles; they do not create the principles. 
24. Thus, the structure makes clear that much of tort law is grounded in the concept of 
duty or legal obligation, where duty is the basic legal question which the judge decides. The 
judge decides it because it is a legal question. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
Articulating and developing law is for the judge's finding of facts and whether the governing 
legal standards are breached is for the jury. 
Put differently, the key inquiry in any tort case is defining the obligation which one per-
son owes to another, whether the case involves what we think of as an intentional tort, neg-
ligence, defamation, strict liability, and others. Of course, defining the obligation is a legal 
question. It is, in the parlance of negligence, a question of duty. Thus, it is clear that the 
judges' law-making function is triggered and pervasive throughout all of the elements of 
negligence and torts in general. The Legal Realists, led by Leon Greene and Wex Malone, 
taught twentieth century American tort lawyers that virtually all questions of proximate or 
legal cause were really policy questions directly related to the underlying duty inquiry. As 
such, legal cause decisions were policy decisions. See Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Neg-
ligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014, 1033-45 (1928). 
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comply with the applicable legal obligation? There is a question of cau-
sation-in-fact: did the defendant bring about a proscribed result? 
There is an issue of legal causation: is it fair to hold the defendant 
liable for the injury which occurred and the manner in which it oc-
curred? And finally, there is a damages issue: what damages can the 
plaintiff recover in this case?25 In addition to supplying comprehensive 
clarity, the structure makes something else clear-there is law at 
every element. Many things we study or teach as issues of breach, 
cause-in-fact, legal causation, or damages are really legal decisions 
about the scope of the defendant's duty or legal obligation. 
Section II will consider possible options for torts structures and set 
forth the proposed overarching structural model, which mirrors the el-
ements of negligence. Section III will restate the proposed structure 
and explain it in the context from which it arose-negligence. Section 
IV will apply the structure to products liability. Section V will show 
how the structure applies to cases involving ultrahazardous and ab-
normally dangerous activities. Section VI will show how the structure 
applies to defamation cases. Section VII will show how it also applies 
to and explains defamation cases. Throughout, it will be apparent that 
there are legal questions relating to the defendant's duty or obligation 
to the plaintiff that arise as subparts of other elements and thereby 
potentially confuse the law-or at least the allocation of decisionmak-
ing authority. Finally, Section VIII will offer a brief conclusion. 
II. CONSIDERING STRUCTURAL OPTIONS 
There are multiple ways to go about articulating an organizational 
or explanatory structure for torts. At the most modest level, one could 
separate the nominate torts from the rest. Such an exercise is more 
taxonomical and historical than anything else, and it does not move 
the law forward but mires it in its roots. One could certainly argue that 
the development of torts and its organization, or lack thereof, is his-
torical. That is, at common law, most of the nominative torts grew out 
of the writ of trespass, and negligence grew out of the writ of trespass 
on the case. 2 6 This evolutionary view provides a possible explanation 
for some of the differences we see in torts, and some might be satisfied 
to conclude that legal habits styled in the Middle Ages simply stuck. 
One accepting this historical explanation might shrug off further or-
ganizational effort to explain torts on some structural basis. Under 
this historical view, torts that did not arise out of the alluvial soils of 
25. More broadly, one might ask what remedy is appropriate in this case, as plaintiffs 
in tort cases sometimes seek injunctive relief in the form of restitution, but damages are far 
more common. 
26. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 6, at 28-29. See also supra note 16 and ac-
companying text. 
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the common law represent societal responses to changing circum-
stances and new needs-even if they all but developed free from any 
torts metastructure. 27 Courts may create new torts in response to 
twentieth or twenty-first century policy needs, but in doing so they 
contribute to torts' seemingly incoherent complexity. The problem 
with the historical view of torts is that first, it largely ignores the 
civil law's influence or approach to torts; and second, it does not pro-
vide a coherent organizational structure for a most important area of 
private law. 
Alternatively, one could offer a "big" theory, like efficiency for the 
legal economists; 2 8 strict liability based on history and cause; 2 9 femi-
nism;3 0 communitarianism;3 1 or risk spreading.3 2 While these are use-
ful and even brilliant theories, they are theories. They are not analyt-
ical or organizational structures.33 These theories purport to explain 
or justify results. They are also normative and push courts in theoret-
ically result-oriented directions. For instance, law and economics 
scholars urge courts to reach conclusions that foster economic effi-
ciency.3 4 A feminist scholar might explain results in cases based on so-
cietal discrimination against women and justly urge courts to take 
feminist perspectives into account when deciding cases.35 A communi-
tarian might urge the adoption of community values.3 6 The risk 
spreader would impose liability or responsibility on the cheapest cost 
27. The reins on unlimited growth is the nature of the common law process and the 
policies supposedly underlying all of tort law: deterrence of undesirable conduct, avoiding 
overdeterrence of socially desirable activity, compensation, risk spreading, society's sense of 
fairness, deference to legislative will, and a healthy respect for precedent. See supra note 19 
and accompanying text. 
28. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
(1970); Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEx. L. REV. 757, 763-64 
(1975) ("[T]he legal system itself ... has been strongly influenced by a concern . . . with 
promoting economic efficiency."); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 7 (3d ed. 2003). 
29. See generally Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 
(1973). 
30. See generally MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 
(1999). 
31. See generally Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Communitarianism: Where 
Rights Meet Responsibilities, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 649 (1995). 
32. See generally Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of 
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Mark A. Geistfeld, Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts: 
Carrying Calabresi Further, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165 (2014). 
33. Certainly, some of these theories offer clear guides for decisionmaking. Posner urges 
decisions based on economic efficiency. Posner, supra note 28. Epstein urges a return to a 
type of trespass based strict liability. Epstein, supra note 29. In that regard, they counsel 
how to decide. What I am striving to do is focus on what is being decided and how it involves 
a judge articulating law rather than how she should decide. 
34. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
35. C.f CHAMALLAS, supra note 30, at 171-73. 
36. See Ackerman, supra note 31, at 683-84. 
37 
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avoider or the one best able to spread the risk across a broader group.
The structure described herein is not normative. It does not push re-
sults in any particular direction; instead, it provides a comprehensive 
model for the steps involved in deciding tort cases of all types and for 
who makes which decisions at which step. It seeks to clarify and ex-
plain the process of decisionmaking, not the result. 
The proposed model articulates what is common to all tort claims, 
and it sets forth a unifying structure. The goal is to identify one struc-
ture that fits all torts. A good place to begin is the modern civil law of 
torts. The next subsection will briefly describe the civil law approach 
to torts. The civil law is comprehensive and systematic. The model ex-
emplifies those traits while also building upon and incorporating the 
common law of torts. 
A. The Civil Law of Torts 
It is an initial principle of the civil law that today's civil law judge 
or scholar looks first to the civil code when dealing with private law; 
she does not consult the cases first but the Code itself.38 The most re-
cent version of the French Civil Code, in its general articles on torts or 
d6lits,3 9 provides in part: 
Art. 1240. - Any human action whatsoever which causes harm to 
another creates an obligation in the person by whose fault it oc-
curred to make reparation for it. 
Art. 1241. - Everyone is liable for harm which he has caused not 
only by his action, but also by his failure to act or his lack of care. 40 
Article 1240 provides a broad statement of the legal obligation 4 1 not to 
injure another. 4 2 Everyone who is at fault and causes injury must repair 
37. See Calabresi, supra note 32, at 517-19. 
38. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 (1998) ("The sources of law are legislation and custom."). 
See also id. cmt. b (stating that jurisprudence is a secondary source of law). 
39. The French translation for torts is d6lits. GOVERNMENT OF ONTARIO, ONTARIO 
ENGLISH-FRENCH LEGAL LEXICON 263 (1987). 
40. JOHN CARTWRIGHT ET AL., THE LAW OF CONTRACT, THE GENERAL REGIME OF 
OBLIGATIONS, AND PROOF OF OBLIGATIONS 27 (2016), http://www.textes.justice.gouv.fr/ 
art-pix/THE-LAW-OF-CONTRACT-2-5-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZP2-U3ZC]. The Louisi-
ana Civil Code has a similarly broad article. Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code, derived 
from the 1804 version of the Code Napoleon authored, also states in part: "Every act what-
ever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair 
it." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315(A) (2001). 
41. Of course, the French and civil law of contracts is called obligations. SAUL 
LITVINOFF, 5 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS § 1.1, at 1 (2d ed. 
2001). Tort law "obligations" are still obligations in the colloquial sense, but they are not 
voluntarily entered into as are contracts. See generally Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 249 
So. 2d 133 (La. 1971); P. Olivier & Sons, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Lake Charles Harbor and 
Terminal Dist., 160 So. 419 (La. 1935). 
42. It is true that the French Civil Code currently has a number of articles after the 
general statement of liability for fault, which are more specific. CARTWRIGHT ET AL., supra 
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it. Article 1241 makes clear that negligence or the lack of care is a type 
of fault.43 
The late Tulane torts professor and scholar, Ferdinand Stone, wrote 
that the civil law of torts had three core elements: fault, cause, and dam-
age. 4 4 But the three concepts of fault, cause, and damage provide a ra-
ther stark skeleton upon which to build a comprehensive torts structure. 
Fault, cause, and damage do not, standing alone, adequately take ac-
count of and encapsulate all the elements of all American torts. Nor do 
the words fault, cause, and damage provide sufficient specificity or di-
rection to American lawyers and judges who would wonder exactly what 
fault means and what type of causation is required. Damages are some-
what less troublesome, but Professor Stone's basic model also fails to 
adequately explain who decides what. 
B. Moving Towards a More Detailed Structure: Negligence 
Something slightly more detailed and perhaps more robust than 
Professor Stone's civil law three-headed model is desirable and possi-
ble. The model proposed herein combines the simple elegance of 
Stone's model and practically links his civil law model with the Amer-
ican, common law tradition. The model is comprehensive, like the civil 
law, and, simultaneously, works from and adopts a structure with 
which American jurisprudence is already familiar. In doing so, it prac-
tically explains who-between judge and jury-ought to be deciding 
what. 
The most descriptive, prescriptive, and familiar structure for all of 
torts is the analytical structure for negligence. Negligence consists of 
four or five elements: duty, breach, causation, and damages. Negli-
gence consists of four elements if we say that causation has two sub-
elements: cause-in-fact and legal cause. Negligence consists of five el-
note 40, at 27 (articles 1241-1244). In that regard, the Code tends, in a way, to mirror the 
common law with its separate categories of tort liability. Louisiana follows suit. However, 
the initial overarching article and its message-one at fault who causes damages is liable to 
fix it-provides one big principal from which the more specific articles follow. LA. CIV. CODE 
ANN. arts. 2315-2324.2 (2018). In that way, it seems to provide the beginning of some uni-
versal structure for analysis of torts cases. 
43. Suzanne Galand-Carval, Fault Under French Law, in UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW: 
FAULT 89 (Pierre Widmer ed., 2005); Olivier Mor6teau, Basic Questions of Tort Law from a 
French Perspective, in BASIC QUESTIONS OF TORT LAW FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
59, 72 (Helmut Koziol ed., 2015); DALLOZ, RtFORME DU DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS: UN 
SUPPLEMENT AU CODE CIVIL 2016, at 30 (2016) ("Le sous-titre II intitul6 << La responsabilit6 
extracontractuelle ) reproduit in extenso des articles 1382 A 1386-18 du code civil . . . ." This 
means that art. 1240 is identical to old art. 1382 and 1241 identical to old 1383). 
44. FERDINAND F. STONE, 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: TORT DOCTRINE § 10, at 
19 (1977). See also Andr6 Tunc, A Codified Law of Tort-The French Experience, 39 LA. L. 
REV. 1051, 1056 (1979) ("No less remarkable is the fact that the common law has never for-
mulated a general principle of civil liability."). 
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ements if we say that cause-in-fact and legal cause are not sub-ele-
ments, but rather that they stand alone. The model will present them 
separately but will note that for some torts, such as the intentional 
torts and defamation, the legal cause element may not always be ex-
press. Negligence is the most common of all torts.4 5 In addition, other 
areas of tort law incorporate or build upon negligence concepts-ex-
amples include products liability (particularly design and warning 
cases), 4 6 defamation cases involving private party plaintiffs suing over 
speech which is a matter of public concern, negligent misrepresenta-
tion,47 and, naturally, the employer's vicarious liability for negligent 
acts of employees. 4 8 Thus, it is both a convenient and familiar founda-
tion upon which to build the structure of torts. 
It is also a sound foundation upon which to build because all torts 
can be broken down into duty, breach, cause-in-fact, legal cause, and 
damage. The most important element is duty because duty is the ele-
ment or place at which the court sets forth and defines the relevant 
legal obligation. Thus, the definition and scope of the duty or legal ob-
ligation owed is a legal question for the court to decide whether a duty 
is owed to the plaintiff.49 Breach asks whether the defendant complied 
with his legal obligation. 0 Breach is a question of applying the articu-
lated obligation to the facts of the case." It is a mixed question of fact 
and law for the jury or judge as factfinder.5 2 Cause-in-fact involves fac-
tual causation: did the defendant's breach of duty (the legal obligation) 
factually cause the plaintiffs injuries?5 3 Most commonly, the issue is 
45. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS, § 9.1, at 187 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter DOBBS 
ET AL., HORNBOOK] ("Negligence claims represent the great majority of tort claims presented, 
brought, or tried today."). 
46. See, e.g., Louisiana Products Liability Act, LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2800.51-2800.59 
(2009); see also id. § 9:2800.56 (unreasonably dangerous design claims); id. § 9:2800.57 (in-
adequate warning claims). 
47. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 107, at 745 ("[M]isrepresentation frequently 
occurs in ordinary negligence actions .. . and the courts have not found it necessary to dis-
tinguish it in any way from any other negligence."). 
48. Id. § 69, at 499 ("[Vicarious liability] is still an action for negligence, and the ordi-
nary rules of negligence liability are still applied to it."). 
49. More precisely, we might say the issue is whether the defendant owes a duty to the 
class of persons to which the plaintiff belongs for the type of injury which occurred. Thus, 
some courts decide the scope of liability or duty as a matter of law. The general discussion of 
the propriety of that duty/risk approach is beyond the scope of this piece. See Dixie Drive It 
Yourself Sys. New Orleans Co. v. Am. Beverage Co., 137 So. 2d 298, 304 (La. 1962). 
50. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK, supra note 45, § 10.2, at 206 ("[D]uty is whether the de-
fendant is under an obligation to use care to avoid injury to others. Breach, in contrast, is 
whether the defendant did in fact use appropriate care."). 
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 328(B)-328(C) (Am. LAW INST. 1965); id. § 328(C) 
cmt. b ("I]t is the function of the jury to apply to the facts in evidence the standard of conduct 
required by the law in the performance of the defendant' s legal duty."). 
52. Id. §§ 328(B)-328(C). And assuming of course that reasonable minds could differ. 
53. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, § 183. 
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whether it is more probable than not that but-for the defendant's al-
leged tort the plaintiff would not have suffered the injuries for which 
she seeks recovery.5 4 Legal cause is a more intuitive inquiry where one 
decides whether it is fair, under the particular facts of the case, to hold 
the defendant responsible for the particular injuries the plaintiff suf-
fered as a result of the defendant's breach of his legal obligation." Be-
cause the legal cause question asks whether it is fair under the partic-
ular facts of the particular case to hold the defendant responsible, the 
factfinder usually decides legal cause after receiving proper instruc-
tions on the law or duty from the judge. 6 
Inevitably, because fairness and justice are related to the policies 
judges consider when deciding whether to impose a duty, there can be 
some understandable overlap between the duty question and the legal 
cause question. This overlap is most helpfully avoided by making duty 
a question of what the rule generally ought to be for similar types of 
cases 57 and limiting the legal cause question to the peculiar facts of the 
particular case. The duty question should be broad and apply to classes 
of plaintiffs and classes of injuries; it should not be case specific. Legal 
cause asks whether on these particular facts the defendant, whose 
breach of a legal obligation factually caused injuries to the plaintiff, 
should be liable. It asks: is it too unfair, unjust, or bizarre to hold the 
defendant liable in this particular case? The particularized nature of 
the question-tailored to the very case before the court and not some 
other case-makes it appropriate for the factfinder to determine legal 
cause. In some cases, particularly intentional tort cases, there may not 
be a discussion of legal cause because the court might essentially de-
cide legal cause in intentional tort cases as a matter of law based on 
the policy of punishing the intentional wrongdoer and the tendency to 
extend the scope of responsibility. But the legal cause issue is there, 
albeit behind the scenes.5 8 
Before applying the structure, it is important to note that aspects of 
modern tort law are befogged, if not deceptive, because matters that are 
54. Id. § 14.4, at 317. 
55. See Snyder v. LTG Lufttechnische GmbH, 955 S.W.2d 252, 256 n.6 (Tenn. 1997) ("Prox-
imate or legal cause is a policy decision made by the legislature or the courts to deny liability for 
otherwise actionable conduct based on considerations of logic, common sense, policy, precedent 
and 'our more or less inadequately expressed ideas of what justice demands . . . .' " (emphasis 
added) (quoting Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618 (Tenn. 1997))); see also PROSSER AND KEETON, 
supra note 11, § 41, at 263. 
56. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 45, at 321 ("[I]f reasonable persons could differ. 
the issue of 'proximate cause' is submitted to the jury with appropriate instructions on the 
law."). 
57. I.e., negligent infliction of emotional distress, cases involving the failure to act, 
cases involving unborn plaintiffs, etc. 
58. See infra Part VII. 
496 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:485 
actually questions of legal obligation are lurking in the other elements. 9 
Authors organize their torts casebooks in this confusing fashion;60 law-
yers then organize their thinking the same way authors organize torts 
casebooks. Torts teachers confuse our students and the waters become 
muddy. Recognizing the reality that many issues we analyze as part of 
breach, cause-in-fact, legal cause, or damages are really legal questions 
about the scope of the defendant's duty clarifies who ought to be decid-
ing what.61 
For instance, when we talk about breach, we say one breaches her 
duty to another when she does not act reasonably. Of course, the "duty 
to act reasonably" is a statement of duty. It is not a breach question. 
Whether there is a breach depends on a comparison of the facts to com-
mon sense notions of what is reasonable, but the duty is to use reason-
able care. However, most torts books 62 treat the obligation to exercise 
reasonable care in chapters named "standard of care" or "negligence."1 
The name of the chapter is not "duty." Indeed, the obligation to exer-
cise reasonable care is perhaps the most basic of all statements of duty. 
This is not mere semantics because it is the judge who decides or ar-
ticulates duty and the jury who decides breach. Keeping their roles 
separate is essential. The next Section will articulate the model in the 
context in which it arose-negligence. 
III. RESTATING AND AFFIRMING THE STRUCTURE BEFORE APPLYING IT 
A. Duty 
Duty is a crucial and, as just noted, sometimes confusing element. 
It is also the most important. It is where the legal action is and, as 
noted, oft times things that are categorized questions of breach, cau-
sation, or damageS63 are really questions about the existence or extent 
of the defendant's legal obligation or duty. They are legal questions 
59. See infra Part III. 
60. See, e.g., FRANK L. MARAIST ET AL., TORT LAW: THE AMERICAN AND LOUISIANA 
PERSPECTIVES i-vii (3d rev. ed. 2017). I am a responsible co-author of this casebook. Mea 
culpa. 
61. WILLIAM E. CRAWFORD, 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, TORT LAW § 4.2 (2d ed. 
2009) ("Questions of law are for the court; questions of fact are for the jury."). See also infra 
Part III. Another way to say it is that anything in a jury instruction that explains an element 
(or the law relating to an element) is a legal decision that the court has made. And as such, 
it is a judicial statement about the legal obligation that the defendant owes. 
62. ARTHUR BEST & DAVID W. BARNES, BASIC TORT LAW: CASES, STATUTES, AND 
PROBLEMS 91-93 (2003); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 143-45 (8th 
ed. 2004); MARAIST ET AL., supra note 60, at ii; VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE 
AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 129-30 (10th ed. 2000); AARON D. TWERSKI & JAMES A. HENDERSON, 
JR., TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 109-10 (2003). 
63. See infra Part III.B-E. 
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and when courts decide them, judges are making law. They are decid-
ing upon the legal obligation or scope of the duty. Duty is thus a much 
more complex and wider ranging topic than currently suggested in our 
organization of the law of torts.6 4 
What then does it mean to say a person has a duty? The conclusion 
that the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff is a recognition or state-
ment of a legal obligation one person, the defendant, owes to another 
person, the plaintiff. At its most basic, with negligence, a defendant 
has a legal obligation to the plaintiff to exercise reasonable care under 
the circumstances. 6 Why? Because society has determined this, based 
on morality, ethics, deterrence, the desire to compensate the injured, 
and more that people should not expose others to an unreasonable risk 
of harm. The societal actor who made this determination is the court. 
The first judge who uttered the statement that a person had a duty to 
exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to prevent risk to 
another made a monumental legal statement about responsibility.66 
Importantly, if obviously, the court articulates the obligation-reason-
able care under the circumstances. Perhaps because it is generally 
such an obvious statement, one sometimes forgets that it is a basic rule 
of law; but the duty to exercise reasonable care is the most basic duty 
or law in negligence. 
How much care must the defendant sued for negligence exercise? 
Reasonable care under the circumstances. He or she must behave as a 
reasonable person of common or ordinary prudence. 67 Of course, there 
is no such person;68 it is a legal hypothetical-a guideline for the fact-
finder. Whether the defendant has broken or breached that duty re-
quires an analysis of the surrounding circumstances, which is a very 
focused, fact specific inquiry. That is why the factfinder makes the 
breach determination. The fact-based determination of breach is 
64. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, § 125, (explaining the current, more narrow dis-
cussion of the duty element). 
65. See, e.g., Hocking v. Dodgeville, 768 N.W.2d 552 (Wis. 2009); see also DOBBS ET AL., 
supra note 445, § 10.5, at 213 (" [T]he standard of conduct to which the defendant must con-
form is typically the standard of a reasonable person under the circumstances .... ). Simi-
larly, one might say that the duty to comply with a contract to which one is a party is a 
statement of legal obligation. The contract (and applicable law) define the obligation for the 
particular case. The factfinder decides whether the parties have complied with their legal 
obligations. Hometown Fin., Inc. v. U.S., 409 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
66. A search in LexisNexis reveals that the first reported American decision in which 
the phrase is used is Masterton u. Village of Mount Vernon, 58 N.Y. 391, 394 (1874). For an 
early statement of the "prudent" person standard, which is substantially similar, see 
Vaughan v. Menlove (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 492. 
67. Masterton, 58 N.Y. 391; Vaughan (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490; see also PROSSER AND 
KEETON, supra note 11, § 32, at 174. 
68. A. P. HERBERT, UNCOMMON LAw 1-2 (7th ed. 1952). See also LOuIS R. 
FRUMER & MELVIN 1. FRIEDMAN, 21 PERSONAL INJURY-ACTIONS, DEFENSES, 
DAMAGES § 101.01(2)(b) (2019). 
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whether the defendant has violated the legal standard of reasonable 
care, which the court has delineated.69 
Legally, the duty owed may change for certain people; let us call 
them atypical people even though in doing so we recognize no one is 
typical.70 For instance, the law takes account of physical differences in 
articulating and applying the duty to exercise reasonable care. The vi-
sion-impaired or blind person is not typical, but the law does not say: 
"The reasonable (typical) person is not blind so the vision-impaired 
person must act as a reasonable person who is not vision-impaired." 
Instead, the law provides that the vision-impaired person is held to the 
standard of care of the reasonable person who is vision-impaired." 
That is a statement of law; it is a statement of the vision-impaired 
person's legal obligation; it is a statement of duty. A jury is neither free 
to disregard it nor decide that in a particular case it will hold a vision-
impaired person to the standard of care of a reasonable person who 
can see. Why does the law provide for that standard of care or duty? 
Because an alternative rule, holding the vision-impaired person to the 
standard of care of the person who can see, would arguably confine risk 
averse vision-impaired people to their homes.7 2 They would be scared 
to go out or they would have to always be accompanied by another, 
which would be expensive and potentially demeaning and offensive. At 
the same time, holding the vision-impaired person to the standard of 
a reasonable person who is vision-impaired is a determination that al-
lowing vision-impaired individuals to more fully participate in society 
is worth the arguably slightly increased risk they may pose to others. 
These are policy matters appropriately addressed to the court, and 
when the court resolves them, it does so for all vision-impaired per-
sons, not just the one before the court. 
Of course, the duty of the vision-impaired person to behave as a 
reasonable person who is vision-impaired has its limits. Vision-im-
paired people are not permitted to drive cars; they would pose too great 
69. At the end of the day, a factfinder's decision that there has been a breach does not 
constitute law; it constitutes the application of law (the duty to exercise reasonable care) to 
a particular case. 
70. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, § 129. 
71. Another way to say the same thing is to ask, what circumstances does the law man-
date be taken into account when deciding what obligation is owed to others? See id. § 10.9, 
at 223 ("[O]ne with physical illness or other physical disability is held to the standard of a 
reasonable person having such a disability, not to a standard of some ideal or average phys-
ical capacity."); PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 32, at 175 ("As to his physical char-
acteristics, the reasonable person may be said to be identical with the actor."). 
72. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 32, at 175-76 ("The person who is blind ... 
is entitled to live in the world and to have allowance made by others for his disability, and 
the person cannot be required to do the impossible by conforming to physical standards 
which he cannot meet." (footnotes omitted)); DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK, supra note 45, § 10.9, 
at 224 (" [A]n unsighted person is not to be considered negligent merely by going out into the 
world."). 
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a risk if they did so.73 But if a vision-impaired person is driving a car 
and has an accident, the law holds him to the standard of care of the 
reasonable person, not the reasonable person who is vision-impaired 
and driving.74 That too is a statement of duty or law. It is a modifica-
tion of the rights of vision-impaired persons with the risks that their 
engaging in a dangerous behavior like driving would cause to them 
and others. A factfinder is not free to ignore that rule in a particular 
case. Again, the important point is the articulation of the standard of 
care is a statement of duty, law, and legal obligation. 
Another example involves children. In negligence cases, the law 
does not hold the child to the standard of care of a reasonably prudent 
person under the circumstances. Instead, it holds the child to the 
standard of care of a child of like age, intelligence, and experience-
that is a statement of the duty or legal obligation the child owes.75 The 
child standard of care recognizes that children cannot be expected to 
function as reasonably and logically as adults.7 6 It is also a recognition 
of the fact that children need to grow and mature, and for them to grow 
and mature they must be allowed to participate in the life of the com-
munity." Finally, every one of us was once a child, so there is an expe-
riential and intuitive understanding of the growth process. 
In some ways, the child standard of care ignores the supposedly ob-
jective reasonable person standard while at the same time it somewhat 
incorporates it. For instance, the standard is not the reasonable eight-
year-old or ten-year-old but the reasonable child (like the defendant) 
of like age, intelligence, and experience. The child standard is peri-
lously close to being subjective, but it uses the word reasonable. Nev-
ertheless, it is a legal recognition that children do not grow and mature 
at the same rate, so age itself can be misleading. The creation of the 
child standard of care was a policy decision applicable to all children, 
and, as such, it was a legal decision, properly made by judges. The 
factfinder determines if the child complied; the factfinder does not de-
cide the legal standard. 
Not unlike the vision-impaired person, there are limits to the tai-
lored standard of care for children. If a child engages in an adult activ-
73. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK, supra note 45, §10.9, at 224-25 ("To the extent that a 
reasonable person with similar limitations would do so, a disabled person must adjust for 
limitations by using other senses or by altering conduct to minimize the risks created by the 
disability.... A person with failing vision may be expected... to avoid altogether an activity 
like driving . . . ." (footnotes omitted)). 
74. See id. 
75. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, § 134. 
76. Id. 
77. See id. 
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ity, the law holds her to the standard of care of a reasonable adult un-
der the circumstances. 7 8 The ten-year-old stepping away from a car ac-
cident in which she was driving does not exculpate herself by saying: 
"I did okay for a ten-year-old of my abilities." A child engaging in an 
adult activity loses the protection of the standard of care for children. 
The law decides that although it can tolerate some extra risk associ-
ated with growing children, it cannot tolerate that risk when the ac-
tivity in which the child is engaging is an adult activity. Typically, 
adult activities are more dangerous to others than children's activities. 
The decision to hold the child engaged in a dangerous activity to the 
adult standard of care is a legal one. Naturally, some jurisdictions may 
consider something an adult activity and another may consider it a 
childhood activity;79 but that difference is merely the result of different 
community values in different jurisdictions. In such cases, it is accu-
rate to say that the law is different in those jurisdictions. 
Likewise, the court articulates duty in professional negligence 
cases differently than "reasonable care under the circumstances." For 
instance, in medical malpractice cases the law does not mandate that 
a doctor must exercise the level of care of an ordinarily prudent per-
son under the circumstances. Imagine a layperson performing heart 
surgery exiting the operating room and happily proclaiming: "God 
knows whether he'll live or not, but I did a darn good job for someone 
who has no medical training." Instead, the law holds the doctor to the 
standard of care of the reasonable doctor either in the same or simi-
lar8 0 locality or, in the case of specialists, in the nation (which is the 
rule in a case involving a heart surgeon).81 Again, this is a legal state-
ment of duty-the legal obligation owed. The factfinder cannot ignore 
it and decide that a trained doctor did as well or better than a rea-
sonable person who was not a doctor so she should not be negligent. 
In deciding whether to hold the doctor to the standard of care of a 
doctor in the same locality or a similar locality or to a national stand-
ard, the court is also making a legal determination-it is deciding the 
scope of the legal obligation for that jurisdiction. Of course, different 
78. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 32, at 181 ("[W]henever a child, whether as 
plaintiff or as defendant, engages in an activity which is normally one for adults only, such 
as driving an automobile or flying an airplane, the public interest and the public safety re-
quire that any consequences due to the child's own incapacity shall fall upon him rather than 
the innocent victim, and that the child must be held to the adult standard, without any al-
lowance for his age." (citations omitted)). 
79. Compare Neumann v. Shlansky, 294 N.Y.S.2d 628 (Westchester Cty. Ct. 1968) 
(holding an 11-year-old golfer who hit plaintiff with a golf ball to the adult standard of care), 
with Hudson-Connor v. Putney, 86 P.3d 106, 111 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that entrust-
ment and operation of a golf cart are not considered "adult activit[ies]"). 
80. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 32, at 187-88, 188 nn.46-47. 
81. Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 537 (Utah 1981); PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 
11, § 32, at 188, 188 n.48. 
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types of doctors may be held to different standards in the same juris-
diction. 82 That too is law. It is not something factfinders are free to 
ignore as they choose. 83 We could undertake a similar analysis for all 
other professionals. 84 
People engaged in certain other occupations are often said to owe 
higher duties of care or utmost care to protect others. The law pur-
portedly holds them to a stricter standard than reasonable care un-
der the circumstances. Some examples include common carriers who 
owe a duty of "utmost" care to their passengers8 5 or innkeepers who 
also owe a "high" duty of care to their guests.8 6 Some of the reasons 
for these heightened duties are no doubt historical. 87 One intuits that 
the same results might be reached in most cases involving common 
carriers and innkeepers by holding the common carrier or innkeeper 
to a standard of reasonable care of a similarly situated individual, 
noting the particular dependency of the passenger upon the common 
carrier and the guest upon the innkeeper as important circumstances 
in determining breach. Be that as it may, the higher standards of 
care applicable to these certain defendants are rules of law. They are 
an articulation of the legal obligation owed; a factfinder assesses the 
particular facts against that standard, but the factfinder is not free 
to ignore it. The statement that a common carrier or innkeeper owes 
passengers and guests a heightened duty of care is a statement of the 
defendants' duties. 
There are also instances where the law may lower the standard of 
care. The most noteworthy example is the "emergency doctrine."8 8 This 
doctrine provides that a person confronted with an emergency, not of 
their own making, does not have to exercise the level of care that a 
reasonable person would exercise in a non-emergency situation.8 9 She 
must only exercise that level of care that a reasonable person would 
82. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 32, at 188, 188 n.48 (comparing a gen-
eral practitioner to a specialist). 
83. And the standard of care in most cases requires the plaintiff to present expert tes-
timony. While one might say that is a rule of evidence, it also goes to the legal standard. The 
professional is held to the standard of care of a reasonable member of that profession, and 
the law requires expert testimony to articulate that standard. See, e.g., Hassebrock v. Bern-
hoft, 815 F.3d 334, 341-42 (7th Cir. 2016) (applying Illinois law). 
84. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 32, at 185-86 ("Most of the decided cases 
have dealt with surgeons and other doctors, but the same is undoubtedly true of dentists, 
pharmacists, psychiatrists, veterinarians, lawyers, architects and engineers, accountants, 
abstractors of title, and many other professions and skilled trades." (footnotes omitted)). 
85. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2100 (West 2019). 
86. E.g., Taboada v. Daly Seven, Inc., 626 S.E.2d 428, 434-35 (Va. 2006). 
87. See LOuIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN 1. FRIEDMAN, 7 PERSONAL INJURY-ACTIONS, 
DEFENSES, DAMAGES § 23.03(2)(a) (2019); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314(A) 
cmts B & C (AM. LAw INST. 1965). 
88. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 33, at 196-97. 
89. Id. 
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exercise in an emergency.9 0 From a policy perspective, the emergency 
doctrine is a recognition that people (reasonable people) do not always 
think as clearly in an emergency. Once articulated by the courts as a 
matter of first impression, the doctrine is a rule of the legal obliga-
tion-a duty rule. Of course, one might wonder whether the emergency 
is really just one of the circumstances the reasonable person some-
times encounters and there is no need to separately mention it; but 
many courts do, and when they do, the emergency becomes part of the 
law which factfinders must follow in deciding individual cases. 
To sum up the previous few paragraphs, within the general duty to 
exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in negligence cases 
there can be additional, more focused legal statements of the defend-
ant's legal obligation. These legal "rules" are judicial recognitions that 
balancing of rights and risks justifies the alteration of the duty of rea-
sonable care in certain relatively broad types of cases. While reasona-
ble care is always determined in light of foreseeable risks, policies re-
lating to accommodation, expertise, deterrence, or psychological real-
ity (in the case of children and emergencies) lead to refinements of the 
general duty to exercise reasonable care. There are other cases where 
even though the defendant's conduct posed a foreseeable risk of harm, 
other policies and historical considerations led courts to alter or limit 
the duty owed. 
Historically, there were several significant fact situations where 
the court did not impose a duty to exercise reasonable care upon a de-
fendant, even though the defendant's conduct posed a foreseeable risk 
of harm to others. Today it is more common in these situations for the 
court to conclude that a duty is, or may be, owed, but the court will 
couch the duty with conditions; the court will not simply recognize a 
general duty to exercise reasonable care. The torts luminary, Dean 
William L. Prosser, called these situations: "Limited Duties." To 
name a few, at common law, a defendant had no duty to affirmatively 
act to help another person; 9 2 a defendant formerly had no duty to ex-
ercise reasonable care to protect against negligently inflicted emo-
3 tional distress; 9 a defendant had no duty to protect against third party 
criminal misconduct; 94 and there were and are more.95 All of these old 
90. Id. 
91. WILLIAm L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 324-27 (Jesse H. Choper et 
al. eds., 4th ed. 1971). 
92. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK, supra note 45, § 25.1, at 615. 
93. Id. § 29.9, at 713. 
94. See id. § 26.1, at 633-34. 
95. See generally id. §§ 25-26. 
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rules were based upon policy analyses prevalent at the time courts ar-
ticulated them. A no-duty rule, as much as a rule recognizing a duty, 
is a statement about the legal obligation or lack thereof. 
Interestingly, the exceptions to those old no-duty rules that courts 
have developed fit this Article's structural model. For instance, as 
noted, at common law there was no duty to act to help another. Courts 
(and legislatures)9 6 have eroded the rule, but they have not done so 
across the board.97 Instead, they have created exceptions to the no-
duty-to-act rule. One exception provides that there is a duty to act if 
there is a special relationship between the defendant and the plain-
tiff.9 8 For instance, a parent has a duty to act to help his or her minor 
child.99 Stated affirmatively, there is a duty to act to help another if 
the defendant has a special relationship with the person in need of aid. 
The duty statement recognizes the existence of a legal obligation. Crit-
ically, in order to trigger the duty in a particular case, there is an un-
derlying factual question that needs to be answered: was there a spe-
cial relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff? That factual 
question is for the jury, but the statement that one with a special re-
lationship to the victim must act to aid the victim is a legal statement 
from the court-it is law. 
Additionally, determining which relationships the law considers 
special and duty triggering are legal questions. Under the analytical 
approach proposed herein, making those decisions is for the court. 
Likewise, under my structural analysis/proposal if reasonable minds 
could differ on whether the duty triggering special relationship exists 
in a particular case is for the jury-it is purely a question of fact. 
Similarly, some jurisdictions have held that there is no duty to 
protect against third party criminal acts. 00 However, there may be a 
duty, under one test, if the criminal act that occurred was substan-
tially similar to criminal acts which had occurred in the past.101 This 
statement of duty is a statement about the existence of a legal obli-
gation to exercise reasonable care. And again, there is a factual is-
sue-were the crimes substantially similar? Just how substantially 
similar those prior crimes must be to trigger a duty, however, is a 
96. E.g., Soldano v. O'Daniels, 190 Cal. Rptr. 310, 316-18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); MINN. 
STAT. § 604A.01(1) (2018). 
97. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 37, 
at 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2005). 
98. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, § 415. 
99. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK, supra note 45, § 25.4, at 621 ("The relationship of a par-
ent to a minor child likewise almost certainly imposes an affirmative duty upon the parent 
to use reasonable care to rescue the child from a known danger."). 
100. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, § 416. 
101. Id. 
504 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:485 
legal question. Once the relevant court1 02 determines the applicable 
test for substantial similarity, and reasonable minds could differ, the 
substantial similarity of the crimes at issue to the prior crimes is a 
fact question.1 03 
Sometimes the plaintiff relies upon the violation of a statute to es-
tablish the standard of care. If the court accepts the statute as the 
standard of reasonable care under the circumstances-a duty deci-
sion-then the statute sets forth the legal obligation. 10 4 The court de-
cides whether to adopt a statute as the standard of care of the reason-
able person under the circumstances. It does so by asking whether the 
plaintiff is a member of the class of persons the legislature enacted the 
statute to protect 1 and whether the risk is one of the risks legislature 
enacted the statute to guard against.106 The answers to those questions 
are matters of law for the judge to decide.107 
The decision of whether or not a duty exists is a decision about the 
legal existence of an obligation to exercise reasonable care. It is a ques-
tion of law, and thus it is for the court to decide. Of course, whether a 
duty ultimately exists in a particular case may depend upon the reso-
lution of underlying factual issues-in other words, was there a special 
relationship between the defendant and plaintiff? Were the crimes 
substantially similar? Did the defendant commit affirmative acts? But 
the duty statement is a statement of law. Different courts have ana-
lyzed the duty issue with more or less factual specificity, and that fact 
102. Probably an appellate court. 
103. Other courts, like the Louisiana Supreme Court in Posecai u. Wal-Mart Stores, 752 
So. 2d 762, 768 (La. 1999), impose a duty to protect against criminal misconduct if the burden 
of preventing the crime is less than the probability of the crime occurring times the antici-
pated loss if the crime does occur. While the court's conclusion in any particular case is a 
statement of a legal obligation to exercise reasonable care or the lack thereof and so fits the 
structural model, the nature of the test poses the intellectual and structural risk that the 
judge in deciding duty will potentially overlap the jury function in deciding breach, but I am 
getting ahead of myself. 
104. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, §§ 148-58. The analysis in the text is somewhat over-
simplified because it ignores the fact that the procedural effect of violating a statute in a 
negligence case may be: negligence per se (in which case the statute adopted as the standard 
of care in the negligence case sets forth the duty or legal obligation and the defendant is 
negligent unless he establishes a judicially recognized excuse); a presumption of negligence 
(in which case the statute adopted as the standard of care in the negligence case sets forth 
the duty or legal obligation and the defendant is negligent unless he establishes that despite 
the statutory violation he exercised reasonable care under the circumstances); or some evi-
dence of negligence (in which case the violation does not necessarily establish the standard 
of care but is some evidence of it for the jury to consider and the plaintiff maintains the 
burden of proof). 
105. Id. § 153. 
106. Id. § 152. 
107. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK, supra note 45, § 13.1, at 292 ("Judges rather than juries 
determine whether the defendant was under a duty of care at all and if so what standard of 
care applied. . . . If the judge determines that the defendant owed a duty of care, the judge 
will instruct the jury as to the proper standard."). 
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has fueled substantial debate,108 but it is beyond the discussion here. 
After the court articulates the applicable duty or legal obligation, the 
factfinder considers whether or not the defendant breached that duty. 
B. Breach 
Breach is the stage at which the factfinder decides if the defendant 
lived up to his legal obligation. In negligence, if there is a duty, the 
duty is to exercise reasonable care and so, when deciding breach, the 
jury asks itself whether the defendant exercised reasonable care under 
the circumstances. When torts professors teach breach, they dwell 
upon which circumstances the factfinder may consider. If there is a 
sudden emergency, how much care is reasonable? If the defendant is a 
professional, what is the standard of care? If one really thinks about 
it, the answers to these questions are legal conclusions, and are there-
fore part of the duty decision. If the statement about what circum-
stances the jury should consider goes into the jury instruction, it is a 
legal determination and is part of the duty owed by the defendant. The 
breach question then is: did the defendant comply with the applicable 
standard? Thus, the court states the duty, narrowing or specifying if 
the law so provides, and the jury applies the particular facts to that 
statement of duty to determine if there was a breach. The comparison 
of the facts to the articulated standard of care is the breach analysis. 
The jury makes that comparison. 
In a case where the court has, as a matter of law, adopted a statute 
as the standard of care of a reasonable person under the circum-
stances, breach can be a very simple matter; 09 the jury only needs to 
decide whether the defendant violated the statute. To reiterate what-
ever the standard of care is or how it is established by the court-
breach involves deciding if the defendant lived up to his legal obliga-
tion as defined by the court. 
C. Cause-In-Fact 
After duty and breach, the next element of negligence is cause-in-
fact, which, like breach, is a supposedly factual determination for the 
108. See, e.g., Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Cats or Gardens: Which Metaphor Explains Neg-
ligence? Or, Is Simplicity Simpler than Flexibility?, 58 LA. L. REV. 35 (1997) [hereinafter 
Galligan, Cats or Gardens]; Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Revisiting the Patterns of Negligence: 
Some Ramblings Inspired by Robertson, 57 LA. L. REV. 1119 (1997) [hereinafter Galligan, 
Revisiting]; David W. Robertson, Allocating Authority Among Institutional Decision Makers 
in Louisiana State-Court Negligence and Strict Liability Cases, 57 LA. L. REV. 1079, 1092 
(1997) [hereinafter Robertson, Allocating Authority]; David W. Robertson, The Vocabulary 
of Negligence Law: Continuing Causation Confusion, 58 LA. L. REV. 1 (1997) [hereinafter 
Robertson, Vocabulary of Negligence]. 
109. See supra note 103. 
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jury.110 But there are questions of legal obligation lurking behind the 
cause-in-fact inquiry. The court's legal hand is ubiquitous; there are le-
gal determinations involved in cause-in-fact which ultimately shape the 
nature and extent of the total legal obligation. The basic articulation of 
the "but for" test for cause-in-fact is a legal statement. NAhen the court 
uses an alternative test for cause-in-fact in cases where the plaintiff can-
not prove "but for" causation, it is expanding the defendant's liability-
it is expanding the defendant's duty or obligation. 
The traditional test for determining cause-in-fact is the "but for" 
test."' When the factfinder can say that it is more likely than not that 
"but for" the defendant's particular alleged act of negligence the plain-
tiff would not have suffered the particular injuries for which she sues, 
the defendant's act was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiffs injuries. The 
"but for test" itself is a legal statement. The law provides that a "but 
for" cause is sufficient to establish cause-in-fact. The law could be dif-
ferent. Any cause that had "something to do with" 1 1 2 the plaintiffs in-
jury could be sufficient. Or, any act of defendant that enhanced the 
chance plaintiff would be injured could be sufficient.1 1 3 Generally, 
courts do not use such language and adhere to the "but for" test. The 
plaintiff must prove "but for" causation because the law-the court-
says so. The defendant's responsibility in negligence encompasses in-
juries that would not have occurred but for her negligence. 
There are some cases where the "but for" test does not establish 
cause-in-fact; however, the court allows the case to proceed anyway; in 
other words, the court relaxes or adjusts the cause-in-fact test. In es-
sence, the court extends the defendant's legal obligation by relaxing the 
plaintiffs burden of proving cause-in-fact. The law decides that even 
though the plaintiff cannot establish the defendant was a "but for" cause 
of its injuries, the law expands the defendant's legal obligation to protect 
the plaintiff from the injuries she suffered. The court might allow the 
plaintiff to resort to the substantial factor test, 1 1 4 to use alternative lia-
bility," to recover for a lost chance of survival,1 1 6 to rely on market share 
liability,1 1 7 or to use another course of action. 
When the court does so, it is changing the law; it is making a deci-
sion about the defendant's legal obligation. It is saying that even 
though plaintiff cannot prove cause-in-fact under the traditional "but 
110. Or judge as factfinder. 
111. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, § 185. 
112. E.g., Hill y. Lundin & Assocs., Inc., 256 So. 2d 620 (La. 1972). 
113. Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032, 1042 (La. 1991). 
114. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, § 189. 
115. Id. § 193. 
116. Id. § 196. 
117. Id. § 194. 
2019] THE STR UCTURE OF TORTS 507 
for" test, the law will still allow the plaintiff to establish liability based 
on an alternative causation theory. When the court extends the defend-
ant's liability in that manner, it does so because of some overarching 
policy reason. That decision to allow recovery is not really about causa-
tion at all but is about refraining the legal obligation; which, as I have 
used the idea, is about duty. And, the decision to allow a plaintiff to use 
one of those alternative causation theories is always a question for the 
court. Again, think of the jury instruction; if it goes into the jury instruc-
tion, it is law. Thus, the court continues to shape the legal obligation or 
duty, albeit as part of the cause-in-fact inquiry. 
One example arises where two forces combine to bring about dam-
age to the plaintiff. The classic example is two fires, either of which 
alone would have burned down the plaintiffs home, but which combine 
to do so. 11 8 Neither fire is a "but for" cause of the resulting injury be-
cause either fire alone would have caused the damage. Without fire A, 
the building would have still burnt down because fire B would have 
consumed it. Without fire B, the building would have still burnt down 
because fire A would have consumed it. The courts have found both 
fires to be causes-in-fact of the injury. How so? By changing the legal 
test for cause-in-fact. Rather than requiring the plaintiff to establish 
"but for" causation, the courts instead require the plaintiff to establish 
that the relevant defendant's fire was a "substantial factor" in causing 
the injury." 9 By changing the causation test, the court changed the 
law. This is a legal matter. The court's announced legal rule is a state-
ment of the scope of the defendant's legal obligation. 
A clear example of the shaping of the legal obligation or duty re-
lated, on its face, to cause-in-fact1 2 0 occurs in lost chance of survival 
cases. 12 1 In those cases, courts that adopt the theory do not change the 
"but for" cause-in-fact test; instead, they legally redefine recoverable 
damages. In essence, the court concludes that the duty (to exercise rea-
sonable care) includes the risk that a breach of the duty will deprive 
the plaintiff of a chance of surviving. 12 2 
In a lost chance of survival medical malpractice claim, a health care 
provider deprives a plaintiff with less than a fifty percent chance of 
118. Anderson v. St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45, 48 (Minn. 1920). 
119. See id. 
120. And included in torts casebooks in the chapters on cause-in-fact. See supra note 62 
and accompanying text. 
121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 
cmt. n (Am. LAW INST. 2005). 
122. See, e.g., Pipe v. Hamilton, 56 P.3d 823, 829 (Kan. 2002) (holding that a five percent 
to ten percent chance of survival was actionable and not de minimis). The same may be said 
if the defendant has increased the risk of the plaintiff suffering some adverse condition or 
disease in the future. Joseph H. King, Jr., "Reduction ofLikelihood" Reformulation and Other 
Retrofitting of the Loss-of-a-Chance Doctrine, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 491, 502 (1998). 
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survival of that chance when the health care provider commits mal-
practice in treating that underlying condition.123 After the patient dies 
from the condition, it cannot be said that but for the defendant's neg-
ligence the patient would not have died, because statistically the dece-
dent would have died from the condition anyway. Thus, if the patient's 
beneficiaries sue for wrongful death arising from the defendant's neg-
ligence, the case would be unsuccessful because the wrongful death 
plaintiffs cannot establish cause-in-fact under the "but for" test. How-
ever, if the court allows the plaintiff to restate the damages as the loss 
of the chance of survival1 2 4 rather than death, the "but for" test works, 
and the plaintiff can recover. The "but for" test works because one can 
say that but for the malpractice, the decedent would not have lost the 
less than fifty percent chance of survival. 1 25 By restating the allowable 
recoverable damages-to allow recovery for the lost chance damages-
the court has made it so the plaintiff can establish "but for" causation. 
That decision is not factual-it is a legal, policy-based decision. Such 
a decision is to say that the health care provider's legal obligation or 
duty to the patient includes the obligation to prevent the loss of a 
chance of survival. And, if the defendant health care provider deprives 
the plaintiff of a chance of survival, those damages are recoverable. 
Again, the court is defining the duty or obligation. 
In Summers v. Tice, two hunters fired their shotguns at a bird, and 
a pellet from one of their guns struck the plaintiff in the eye. 12 6 The 
plaintiff could not prove "but for" causation because the available fo-
rensics could not determine from which hunter's gun the blinding pel-
let had come. 1 27 The court still allowed the case to proceed by switching 
the burden of proof to the defendants. 128 This switch was a legal deci-
sion-it was a decision about responsibility and obligation. Of course, 
neither defendant could prove he was not the source of the blinding 
shot, resulting in what some call "alternative liability." 1 2 9 The court 
123. See, e.g., Smith v. State of La., Dep't of Health and Hosp., 676 So. 2d 543, 547 (La. 
1996). 
124. Whether separately valued as a lump sum or valued as the percentage of survival 
lost times what would have been recoverable in a wrongful death suit. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 cmt. n (AM. LAW INST. 
2005). 
125. If the chance of survival was greater than fifty percent, say eighty-five percent, the 
plaintiffs should succeed on the wrongful death action, although the defendant might wonder 
why he is not liable for the loss of an eighty-five percent chance of survival rather than the 
entire wrongful death. 
126. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 2 (Cal. 1948). 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 4. 
129. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 28(b). 
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here essentially redefined cause-in-fact under the mantle of a shift in 
the burden of proof. 130 
In the products liability context, some courts have adopted the the-
ory of market-share liability, where challenges arise for plaintiffs in 
determining exactly which of several manufacturers' identical, or 
nearly identical, products injured them.13 1 In market-share liability 
cases, the plaintiff cannot identify the source of the particular drug or 
substance which caused her damage, but courts which adopt the the-
ory of market-share liability allow the plaintiff to prove causation and 
responsibility based on the defendant's production of the generic prod-
uct and their participation in the marker. 13 2 In essence, the court is 
extending a defendant's duty to a plaintiff for whom there is only a 
statistical possibility-often less than fifty percent-that they were af-
fected by a particular defendant's product. 
D. Legal Cause 
The next element for negligence is legal or proximate cause. It is 
the element where the jury decides, based on the common sense of the 
community, whether, given all they have seen and heard, the defend-
ant should be liable to the plaintiff. The jury decides if it is just and 
fair under the circumstances to impose liability and whether the way 
in which the damage ultimately occurred was so bizarre or out of the 
ordinary that it would be unfair to hold the defendant responsible. In 
asking the jury to decide legal or proximate cause, we are asking the 
jurors to decide based on what Justice Andrews called "practical poli-
tics."133 We are not asking them to decide based on legal policy, but 
rather, we are, or should be, asking them to apply the common sense 
of the community. 
Traditionally, with proximate cause courts instructed juries to in-
quire about whether the injury and the way it occurred was foreseea-
ble, natural, probable, direct, or remote. 13 4 Judges also instructed ju-
ries about intervening and superseding causes.135 The legal realists 
130. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK, supra note 45, § 14.9, at 328. In market share liability 
cases the plaintiff cannot identify the source of the particular drug or substance which 
caused her damage but courts which adopt the theory of market share liability allow the 
plaintiff to prove causation and responsibility based on the defendant's production of the 
generic product and their participation in the marker. Id. § 14.10, at 330. 
131. Sindellv. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980). 
132. See id. 
133. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
134. D.E. Buckner, Comment Note Foreseeability as an Element of Negligence and Prox-
imate Cause, 100 A.L.R.2D 942, 945 (1965). 
135. See DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK, supra note 45, §§ 15.14-15.19, at 361-75. 
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thought such words obscured the matter. 136 As such, they made signif-
icant contributions by pointing out that much of what the law called 
proximate cause was not about causation at all but was a question of 
legal policy.137 And legal policy is for the judge to decide. The Realists 
created the duty/risk 3 8 method of determining what the common law 
traditionally called proximate cause. It recognizes that the common 
law proximate cause element was often really a decision regarding the 
scope of the defendant's duty. The duty/risk method conflates the duty 
and proximate cause question into one question: does the defendant's 
duty protect against the risk which occurred in this case and the man-
ner in which it occurred? 13 9 The authors of the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts seem to agree with this duty/risk or scope of the duty method of 
analysis and replace legal cause with a risk analysis under which one 
is responsible for those risks which made one negligent in the first 
place. 140 The specificity with which the court asks the duty/risk or 
scope of the risk question, vis-A-vis the particular facts before the 
court, as opposed to the general type of risk and general manner of 
occurrence, is a subject of some significant debate. 14 1 That subject is 
generally beyond the scope of this Article. Although, because this Ar-
ticle claims that legal cause calls for the common sense of the commu-
nity in the particular case before the court, it necessarily leans towards 
more general analyses of duty and scope of duty. 142 
E. The Damages 
Damages is the element where the jury evaluates, measures, and 
quantifies the plaintiffs injuries. 143 That is it. The jury never gets to 
damages if it does not conclude that the defendant's act breached the 
applicable legal obligation and caused harm. For damages, the jury 
136. See e.g., Leon Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401 
(1961). 
137. LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 74-152 (1930). 
138. See Leon Green, Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines, 41 TEx. L. REV. 42 (1962); Leon 
Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543 (1962). 
139. Malone, supra note 18, at 79, 98-99. 
140. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 
cmts a & b (AM. LAW INST. 2005). 
141. See Galligan, Cats or Gardens, supra note 108; Galligan, Revisiting, supra note 108; 
David W. Robertson, Allocating Authority, supra note 108; Robertson, Vocabulary of Negli-
gence, supra note 108. 
142. Arguably making the legal cause question part of the basic duty question would 
make the structure of torts cleaner because all torts do not seem to include this ultimate 
fairness inquiry in their elements. I will discuss this reality below. 
143. This Article says damages throughout because damages are what plaintiffs usually 
seek in torts cases. The paper could just as easily have said remedy because there are occa-
sions where plaintiffs seek injunctions or restitution in torts cases. In a case where a plaintiff 
sought damages or injunction, the structure is still applicable albeit with slightly different 
remedies. 
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adds up the harm the defendant's breach caused. Evaluating, measur-
ing, and deciding quantum is the extent of the damages analysis. The 
jury certainly must make difficult decisions in quantifying the plain-
tiffs harm, but the doctrine should not overstate the legal aspect of 
damages. 
Everything else-other than evaluation, measuring, and quantify-
ing-that people say about damages in books and cases are really 
statements of duty or law. For instance, scholars and courts ask: what 
types of damages are recoverable? 144 Should the jury take the non-tax-
ability of personal injuries into account when awarding damages? 1 45 
Should the jury reduce to present value? 14 6 Are medical monitoring 
damages recoverable? 147 All of these are legal questions about the scope 
of the defendant's obligation or responsibility. While torts books gen-
erally treat these subjects as damage issues, they are, in essence, de-
cisions about the legal obligation owed; they are duty questions. Three 
examples explicate this point: negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress, wrongful death, and loss of consortium. 
Whether, and when, the law recognizes recovery for negligently in-
flicted emotional distress is an issue of the defendant's legal obligation, 
not an issue of adding up damages. It is a duty issue-the extent of the 
recognized legal obligation. It is not an issue of whether the plaintiff 
proved she suffered this alleged damage and how much. It is a matter 
of the law determining whether or not it will allow that type of recov-
ery at all. Does the duty (to exercise reasonable care) include the risk 
that the plaintiff will suffer emotional distress? Naturally, a jurisdic-
tion may determine that only certain people-those in the zone of dan-
ger, 14 8 those impacted, 14 9 those exposed to a hazardous substance,15o 
those close family members who view an injury-causing event1'-are 
allowed to recover, but that is a determination of duty or obligation; it 
is not merely a determination of the extent of injury. 
Additionally, casebook authors formerly included wrongful death 
discussions in the chapter on damages, or at least near it. 15 2 Again, 
who can recover damages they suffer as the result of the death of 
another and what those recoverable damages are is a duty question. 
144. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK, supra note 45, §§ 34.1-34.2, 34.4, at 851-59. 
145. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, § 482. 
146. Id. § 482. 
147. Id. § 479. 
148. See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 555 (1994). 
149. See id. 
150. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, § 394. 
151. Id. § 391. 
152. E.g., SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 62, at xv (including wrongful death in a separate 
chapter immediately following a chapter on damages); TWERSKI & JAMES, supra note 62, at 
xviii-xix; DOMINICK VETRI ET AL., TORT LAW AND PRACTICE xxi-xxii (2d ed. 2002). 
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Recognition of a beneficiary's right to recover for the death of another 
is a legal conclusion that the tortfeasor's duty not to injure the dece-
dent includes a duty to someone else-usually a close relative-who 
suffered no injury at all but the loss of a loved one. The value of those 
damages is a jury question. Does it go in the jury instruction? If it 
does, it is coming from the judge and it is law-it is part of the legal 
obligation. 
The same is true for loss of consortium damages. Casebooks 53 some-
times discuss the subject under damages; however, whether the loved 
one1 54 of a physical-injury victim may recover for his or her loss of sup-
port, society, service, and intimacy with someone whom the defendant 
physically injured is an issue of the defendant's legal obligation. When 
a court recognizes the loss of consortium claim, it is extending the duty 
not to physically injure the direct victim to a third person and saying 
the duty not to physically injure A includes a duty not to damage B's 
relationship with A.1 55 
F. Recap 
Recapping before applying the structure to other torts, the grand 
structure of tort law based on the elements of negligence is as follows: 
1) Duty-What is the legal obligation? Most significantly, here one 
sees that many issues included under discussions of breach, cause-
in-fact, legal cause, or damages are really legal questions. They are 
really determinations about the scope of the legal obligation which 
the defendant owes to the plaintiff. Courts decide duty. 
2) Breach-Did the defendant comply with the legal obligation or not? 
3) Cause-in-Fact-Was the breach a cause of the plaintiff s injuries 
under the legally applicable test (as defined by the court, which is 
essentially a duty question)? 
4) Legal or Ultimate Cause-Should society impose liability for the 
breach or would doing so be unfair, given the common sense of the 
community? 
5) Damages-Did the plaintiff prove damage and, if so, how much? 
The following sections will apply the structure to other torts; in other 
words, beyond the realm of negligence itself, beginning with products 
liability.156 
153. E.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 62, at xviii-xix; SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 62, at 542; 
VETRI ET AL., supra note 152, at 592. 
154. The loved one has suffered no physical injury at all. 
155. This Article mentioned earlier the recoverability of medical monitoring as a ques-
tion of legal obligation, not damages, per se. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
156. Of course, I might begin by claiming easy victories, such as pointing out that negli-
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IV. PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
This Section applies the structure to several types of products lia-
bility cases. The claims fit the model, which helps to make clear the 
similarities of the products claims to negligence claims, rather than 
the differences. 
A. Mismanufacture 
The structure of torts set forth herein, based on the elements of 
negligence, applies to products liability claims. Beginning with a gar-
den-variety mismanufacture case-a case where the manufacturer al-
legedly manufactured and sold a product that was defective in compo-
sition or construction-the elements fit within the model. Imagine a 
car which has a missing screw in the brake assembly. When the driver 
pushes on the brake pedal the car does not stop, resulting in a collision 
and injury. Driver sues manufacturer. Is manufacturer liable? What 
must the plaintiff prove? 
In most United States' jurisdictions today, the plaintiff must prove 
that the defendant's product (1) had a construction or composition de-
fect in that it deviated from the manufacturer's plans, specs, and/or 
design for the product; (2) the deviation rendered the product unrea-
sonably dangerous; and (3) the deviation caused the plaintiff injury.15 7 
The defendant cannot exculpate himself by proving that it exercised 
reasonable care in manufacturing the product or even that it exercised 
extraordinary care. That is why courts1 8 and commentators'1 9 say that 
strict liability is appropriate. 
Applying the proposed structure of torts and beginning with duty, 
the manufacturer has a duty to make a product that is not unreason-
ably dangerous due to a manufacturing flaw (or defect), no matter how 
much care the manufacturer exercised in manufacturing the product. 
That is a statement of law-it is a statement of duty. The legal obliga-
tion specifies what the law requires of the manufacturer; it requires a 
defect-free product. It does not require the plaintiff to prove that the 
manufacturer failed to exercise reasonable care. The result is a policy-
based conclusion that the risk of injury from manufacturing or con-
struction flaws should fall on the manufacturer. The manufacturer 
made the product; the manufacturer sold the product; the manufac-
turer profited from the sale; the manufacturer is in a better position 
gent misrepresentation fits the model or that a nuisance arising from the defendant's negli-
gence fits the model. These are easy victories because, in essence, negligent misrepresenta-
tion and negligently caused nuisances are essentially plain old negligence claims. 
157. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 1.3, at 34 (2d ed. 2008). 
158. E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900-01 (Cal. 1963); West 
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 89 (Fla. 1976). 
159. OWEN, supra note 157, § 5.1, at 254. 
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than the injured victim to guard against the occurrence of the injury; 
and the manufacturer is in the superior position to spread the cost of 
the injury among a broader population through its pricing mechanism 
and insurance.1 6 0 
The next element in the proposed structure is breach. As, with neg-
ligence, the breach question asks whether the defendant manufacturer 
complied with its legal obligation: was the product unreasonably dan-
gerous because of a construction defect? Did the manufacturer comply 
with its legal obligation? That's the question of breach. With negli-
gence, the issue is compliance with the legal obligation. Unlike negli-
gence, in a mismanufacture case, due care or the lack thereof is irrel-
evant, but the jury still must decide if the product was unreasonably 
dangerous, as defined by the court. 
Turning next to cause-in-fact, plaintiffs in products liability cases 
must prove that the unreasonably dangerous aspect of the relevant 
product was a cause-in-fact of their injuries. It is as simple as that. 
Everything discussed in the negligence section about cause-in-fact 
would also apply in a products case. Courts commonly use the "but for" 
test in products liability cases.161 Courts also rely upon the "substantial 
factor" test where appropriate, 162 and market-share liability arose in 
products liability cases. 163 There is essentially no difference here be-
tween negligence and products liability. Again, the court determines 
the appropriate cause-in-fact test (which is really part of the legal ob-
ligation determination), and the jury applies it.164 
The structure next considers legal or proximate cause, which is an 
element in a products liability case, as it is in a negligence case.165 
Sometimes the proximate cause question involves whether the plain-
tiffs use of the product was a misuse,16 6 as opposed to a reasonably 
160. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., 
concurring). Cf. JANE STAPLETON, PRODUCT LIABILITY 103-17 (1994). 
161. OWEN, supra note 157, § 1.3, at 39-40. 
162. Id. § 1.3, at 40. 
163. Id. § 1.3, at 40-41. See also supra Part III.C. 
164. Normally, in a construction defect products liability case, the cause-in-fact test will 
be "but for." The question there is, can the jury say by a preponderance of the evidence that 
"but for" the mismanufacture the plaintiffs injuries would not have occurred? OWEN, supra 
note 157, § 11.2, at 769. 
165. Id. §§ 12.1-12.3, at 802. 
166. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 2 
cmt. m (AM. LAW INST. 2005). The Restatement states as follows: 
Product sellers and distributors are not required to foresee and take precautions 
against every conceivable mode of use and abuse to which their products might 
be put ... . Once the plaintiff establishes that the product was put to a reasonably 
foreseeable use, physical risks of injury are generally known or reasonably know-
able by experts in the field. It is not unfair to charge a manufacturer with 
knowledge of such generally known or knowable risks. 
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anticipated use. 1 67 Determining whether the defendant has a legal ob-
ligation to build a product that does not injure the plaintiff who mis-
uses it, or who uses it in a way that the manufacturer should not have 
foreseen, is a duty question. If reasonable minds could differ on the 
outcome in a particular case, it is a jury question. 
The damages analysis in a products liability case is no different 
than it is in a negligence case. The same types of damages and con-
cerns raised in the discussion on damages in negligence applies in a 
products liability case. 
B. Design 
The structural model is even more clearly applicable in modern 
design cases, which, in many jurisdictions, are essentially negligence 
cases. That said, the statement of legal obligation or duty can be a 
bit confusing when one considers matters such as whether the plain-
tiff must establish the existence of a reasonably available alternative 
design and the effect of state of the art evidence, but those are mere 
incidents of challenging difficulty. 168 They do not alter the basic point 
that the five-pronged structure derived from the elements of negli-
gence works in products liability cases. For instance, the Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts-Products Liability, Section 2(b) provides, in 
part: "A product is defective in design when foreseeable risks of harm 
posed by the product could have been reduced by the adoption of a 
reasonable alternative design . . . and the omission of the alternative 
design renders the product not reasonably safe." 169 That is a state-
ment of law. It is a statement of duty. How safe does the manufac-
turer's design of its product have to be? The law provides that deci-
sion is made vis-A-vis a reasonable alternative design and the result-
ing failure to adopt that alternative design. Thus, the legal obligation 
provides that a product is unreasonably dangerous in design when 
Id. 
167. Some states require that the plaintiffs product use is reasonably anticipated, and 
that the product was the proximate cause of the injury as separate elements. See, e.g., 
Louisiana Products Liability Act, LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2800.51-59 (1988). Be that as it may, 
they are clearly related. Additionally, one could argue that the issue of product misuse is 
a matter for comparative fault, rather than a bar to recover, but that is beyond the current 
discussion. 
168. See OWEN, supra note 157, §§ 8.5, at 520 (discussing reasonable alternative design); 
id. § 10.4, at 706 (detailing an overview of the state-of-the-art defense in product liability 
cases). 
169. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 2 
cmt. d. Several states have adopted this requirement either legislatively or through the 
courts. For example, Louisiana codified the requirement of a reasonable alternative design 
in section 9:2800.56 of the Louisiana Products Liability Act. Maryland also adopted this ap-
proach in Phipps u. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955 (Md. 1976) and Volkswagen ofAmer-
ica u. Young, 321 A.2d 737 (Md. 1974). 
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there was a reasonable alternative design;17 0 the adoption of that rea-
sonable alternative design could have reduced the foreseeable risks 
of harm posed by the product, as designed; and the failure to adopt 
the alternative design rendered the product, as designed, "not rea-
sonably safe."171 That is the legal obligation. 
The breach question then involves the factfinder deciding whether 
the plaintiff has presented evidence of a reasonable alternative de-
sign 172 and whether the adoption of that reasonable alternative design 
could have reduced or avoided the risk of harm. Those decisions are 
mixed questions of fact and law based upon the particular case, and 
the jury would decide them. 
Cause-in-fact is no different than it is in a negligence case, alt-
hough, as noted, the issue of market-share liability generally arises in 
products liability cases 73 rather than garden-variety negligence cases. 
As noted above, the decision to adopt an alternative test for cause-in-
fact is not a causation decision but a legal decision affecting the scope 
of the legal obligation; in other words, duty. 
Legal or proximate cause and damages decisions are the same in 
design cases as negligence and mismanufacture cases. 
V. ULTRAHAZARDOUS OR ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES 
The structure set forth herein also enlightens and applies to liabil-
ity for engaging in abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous activities. 
74 This area of the law is sometimes referred to as absolute liability,1
because one is "responsible" for simply engaging in certain activities 
when they cause damage, even though one is exercising the utmost 
care and is doing the activity exactly as the activity is supposed to be 
done. Supposedly, you do it; you are liable. Under the structure, what 
170. How different can the alternative design be before it is a different product? Does a 
substantially different product constitute an alternative design? These and other questions 
go to narrow or refine the duty analysis in a design case. 
171. The feasibility of adopting the alternative design from an economic and techno-
logical perspective is relevant to determining if the failure to adopt the alternative design 
rendered the product as designed not reasonably safe. See OWEN, supra note 157, § 8.4, at 
511-12. 
172. The issues of how different the alternative design can be or whether a different 
product might count as a reasonable alternative design might technically arise at the breach 
"stage," where a defendant objects to the introduction of the plaintiffs alternative design or 
does so through a motion in limine (a motion filed outside the presence of the jury to exclude 
certain evidence). Even in this context, if the judge decides on admissibility, she is essentially 
making both an evidentiary decision on relevance and/or prejudice, but she is also making a 
statement about the legal obligation owed. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
173. See also DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK, supra note 45, § 14.10, at 330 (describing the 
creation of market share liability to respond to product liability issues). But see OWEN, supra 
note 157, § 11.3, at 786. 
174. See Liability, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (describing absolute liability 
as liability based on causation alone). 
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is the duty or legal obligation? The legal obligation provides that if one 
chooses to engage in an ultrahazardous activity, one assumes or ac-
cepts liability for the damage caused. As in the mismanufacture case, 
the fact that the defendant exercised reasonable or even utmost care 
is irrelevant.15 
Determining which activities are subject to this type of absolute li-
ability is an issue for the court-a duty question. Whatever test the 
court employs-ultrahazardous1 16 or abnormally dangerous 7-it is up 
to the court to decide, as a matter of law, whether the activity in which 
the defendant is engaged is one for which the law imposes absolute 
liability. The Restatements so provide."1 8 Activities which typically ex-
pose an actor to absolute liability simply for engaging in them are 
8 0 blasting," 9 crop dusting, 1 and pile driving.1 81 Deciding whether en-
gaging in a certain activity exposes the defendant to absolute liability 
is a duty determination. 
Breach is remarkably simple in these absolute liability cases. If the 
court has decided that the activity is one of the activities for which the 
law imposes absolute liability, the breach question is: did the defend-
ant engage in the activity? That is it. In fact, in most absolute liability 
cases, breach should not be an issue at all-there would be no question 
whether the defendant engaged in the activity, and the parties would 
either stipulate to that fact or the court would direct a verdict. 
Although duty and breach in absolute liability cases are plaintiff 
friendly, the plaintiff must still establish cause-in-fact. 1 82 Suppose 
Tatiana was admiring her rare Faberge egg that her Great, Great 
Aunt Pavlova left her, and she dropped it. Tatiana wailed as she saw 
the shattered pieces on the floor. Then, twenty minutes later, her 
175. See, e.g., O'Nealv. Int'l Paper Co., 715 F.2d 199, 202 (5th Cir. 1983). 
176. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. h. (AM. LAW INST. 1938). 
177. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 20 
cmt. 1 (Am. LAW INST. 2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 
1965). 
178. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 20 
cmt. 1 ("Whether the activity is abnormally dangerous is determined by the court .... ); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. 1 ("Whether the activity is an abnormally dan-
gerous one is to be determined by the court . . . ."); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 520 
cmt. h ("What facts are necessary to make an activity ultrahazardous under the rule stated 
in this Section is a matter for the judgment of the court."). 
179. E.g., M. W. Worley Constr. Co. v. Hungerford, Inc., 210 S.E.2d 161, 163-64 (Va. 
1974); see also Spano v. Perini Corp., 250 N.E.2d 31, 33 (N.Y. 1969); Whitman Hotel Corp. v. 
Elliott & Watrous Eng'g Co., 79 A.2d 591, 595 (Conn. 1951). 
180. See, e.g., Young v. Darter, 363 P.2d 829, 833-34 (Okla. 1961); see also Loe v. Len-
hardt, 362 P.2d 312, 316-17 (Or. 1961); Gotreaux v. Gary, 94 So. 2d 293, 295 (La. 1957). 
181. See, e.g., Vern J. Oja & Assocs. v. Wash. Park Towers, Inc., 569 P.2d 1141, 1143 
(Wash. 1977); see also Sachs v. Chiat, 162 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Minn. 1968); Caporale v. C. W. 
Blakeslee & Sons, Inc., 175 A.2d 561, 564 (Conn. 1961). 
182. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, § 445. 
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neighbor, Vladimir, suddenly and with no warning began pile driving 
to construct his new dock; Tatiana's house shook and shook. Quickly, 
she brightened up, called her lawyer, and sued Vladimir for engaging 
in an ultrahazardous activity and breaking the egg! Alas, Tatiana 
should not count the proceeds of that lawsuit until the eggs are 
hatched, because even though Vladimir engaged in an ultrahazardous 
activity, that activity was not the cause-in-fact of the broken egg. Ergo, 
cause-in-fact is essential to recovery for damages in "activity" strict 
liability cases. 
Legal cause is as essential in an absolute liability case as it is in a 
negligence or products liability case. Courts1 83 and commentators 1 84 
sometimes say that one is absolutely or strictly liable for everything 
that happens once one engages in the defined ultrahazardous activity. 
However, even if one engages in an ultrahazardous activity, there are 
common sense limits to liability. As with negligence, it is at the legal 
or proximate cause stage that the court asks the jury whether it is fair 
in the common sense of the community to hold the defendant liable for 
the particular injuries which occurred in the particular manner in 
which they occurred. 181 
For instance, a commonly cited case exemplifying the applicability 
of legal cause concepts to absolute liability is the filicide case involving 
blasting and minks. 186 The case arose during whelping season-the 
time when mother minks give birth. 187 The defendant was engaged in 
blasting for construction purposes; presumably, the defendant was ex-
1 8 8 ercising due care. Minks are skittish to begin with, and when the 
mother minks on plaintiff s mink farm experienced the vibrations from 
the blasting, their nervousness increased, and they killed their 
young. 189 As sad, tragic, and disturbing as the events may be in them-
selves from both a psychological and emotional perspective, it also 
meant that the farmer lost his mink crop-fewer minks, fewer furs, 
fewer coats, and lower profits for those concerned. The farmer sued the 
blaster.o90 In his suit against the blaster to recover for the lost mink 
herd, the court refused to allow recovery.' 9 It was just too bizarre. 
Holding the defendant liable was beyond what common sense would 
allow. 
183. See, e.g., Spano, 250 N.E.2d at 35; Caporale, 175 A.2d at 563. 
184. See, e.g., PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 79, at 560. 
185. PRODUCT LIABILITY § 7.04 (LexisNexis). 
186. See generally Madsen v. E. Jordan Irrigation Co., 125 P.2d 794 (Utah 1942). 
187. WHELP, https://www.thefreedictionary.com/whelping [https://perma.cc/FA36-5BMP]. 
188. Madsen, 125 P.2d at 794. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. at 195. 
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Damages are once again damages. The plaintiff must suffer dam-
ages and the plaintiff must prove them. The structure applies; the 
structure works. 
VI. DEFAMATION 
In defamation cases, the structural model must incorporate the U.S. 
Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence limiting and defining 
tort recovery in state (common) defamation cases. 192 It is beyond the 
scope of this Article to exhaustively analyze the interplay of constitu-
tional and state law that is the law of defamation today.1 93 For present 
purposes, it is sufficient to state that the right to recover in a defamation 
suit depends upon whether the plaintiff is a public official, 194 a public 
figure, 1 or a private figure, and whether the subject of the statement is 
a matter of public concern. 196 Also, under state law, the plaintiff must 
prove the publication 97 of a false statement of fact198 of and concerning'99 
the plaintiff,20 0 and that harms the plaintiffs reputation.201 The duty of 
the speaker ultimately turns on both the constitutional categorizations 
and the state law. The next three subsections will analyze the various 
constitutional combinations (status of plaintiff and type of speech) un-
der the proffered structure. The analysis will proceed from the most in-
trusive incursions on state power to the least. 
A. Public Officials and Public Figures 
If the plaintiff who is the subject of the defamatory publication is a 
public official or a public figure then, constitutionally, the plaintiff can-
not recover for defamation under state law unless the plaintiff proves 
that the speaker made the statement with actual malice-knowledge 
192. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, § 558. 
193. See ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION § 1:1-1:12 (5th ed. 2017); see also DOBBS 
ETAL., supra note 15, § 517; PROSSERAND KEETON, supra note 11, § 111, at 771. In addition, 
for the sake of brevity, I will treat both libel and slander together as defamation. But it 
should be noted that the differences between the two involve different legal obligations which 
are part of the duty analysis. 
194. See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
195. See generally Associated Press v. Walker, 389 U.S. 28 (1967); Curtis Publfg Co. v. 
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
196. See generally Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (private figures); 
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (private figure, and 
not a matter of public concern). 
197. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, § 520. 
198. Thus, opinion is not actionable. Id. § 37.19, at 996. That is a legal statement, but it 
may be up to the factfinder to determine whether the statement was opinion or fact or im-
plied the existence of underlying facts. 
199. It would be simpler to say "about" the plaintiff, but the law is not always simple. 
200. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, § 519. 
201. SACK, supra note 193, §2.1. 
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of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.202 To state the obvious, 
that is a statement of the duty or legal obligation. It is a duty shaped 
by the U.S. Supreme Court's First Amendment defamation juris-
prudence, but it is a statement of duty nevertheless. 
After the court defines the legal obligation, the factfinder will 
decide, based on the facts at issue in the particular case, various 
factual/breach questions. Did the defendant make the statement? 
Was it published? Was it defamatory (was it a statement that would 
harm one's reputation in the community)? Did the defendant make 
the statement with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for 
the truth? These are factual questions for the factfinder. 
With the cause-in-fact inquiry, the factfinder decides whether 
the statement did cause harm to the plaintiffs reputation. That is, 
was there actual injury? The jury decides if, assuming there was 
harm to plaintiff s reputation, publishing the defamatory statement 
brought about that harm. 
With defamation and intentional torts, the legal cause analysis 
is not always overt. The decision of whether it is fair to impose lia-
bility, based on the common sense of the community, has been 
shifted to the constitutional analysis briefly set forth above-the 
plaintiff must prove actual malice. The scope of liability or case spe-
cific legal cause question is generally simple-if the defendant pub-
lished the statement and the plaintiff satisfies the other elements 
of her burden of proof, there is little room for the potentially liabil-
ity-relieving role of a proximate cause analysis. Perhaps this fact is 
also because, at common law, liability for defamation was strict and 
harsh. 203 Defamation was a strict liability tort. The law decided the 
scope of liability for defamation, and it was broad. With the consti-
tutional developments described above, U.S. law is much more 
speech friendly, and protection from liability comes from the consti-
tution rather than individual jury determinations about proximate 
cause. 
Finally, at the damages stage, if the plaintiff has established ac-
tual malice, the factfinder places a value upon that injury. Addi-
tionally, punitive damages are constitutionally available, and the 
precise circumstances in which a jury can award them in a public 
official/public figure defamation case depends upon state law, once 
again assuming the defendant acted with actual malice. 
202. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). 
203. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK, supra note 45, § 37.2, at 937 ("Truth was no defense; even 
to laugh at a libel was a crime."); PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 111, at 771-73. 
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B. Private Figures/Speech Which is a Matter of Public Concern 
Alternatively, if the plaintiff is not a public official or public figure 
but the speech involves a matter of public concern, the plaintiff can 
recover for defamation if she establishes negligent publication of a de-
famatory statement about the plaintiff that causes actual harm 2 04 to 
her reputation. The private plaintiff who sues for defamation in a case 
involving a statement of public concern must prove the same things as 
the public official/public figure, except the private plaintiff need not 
prove that the defendant acted with actual malice. Rather, the private 
plaintiff in a case involving speech that is a matter of public concern 
must prove that the defendant was at least negligent in making the 
statement.2 05 Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court has said that the 
private plaintiff in a case involving speech that is a matter of public 
concern must prove actual injury, 20 6 unless the plaintiff establishes the 
defendant did, in fact, make the statement with actual malice. 207 Then 
the court may award presumed damages, a throwback to the days of 
strict liability for defamation. That is, the defendant is liable even 
though the plaintiff has not established actual injury. Thus, the de-
fendant's duty not to defame a private figure plaintiff, relating to 
speech that is a matter of public concern, requires the plaintiff to prove 
at least negligence and actual injury. If the plaintiff goes further and 
proves actual malice, then the defendant's legal obligation may, de-
pending upon state law, include responsibility for presumed and puni-
tive damages. 
At breach, the factfinder determines whether the defendant made 
the allegedly defamatory statement; whether the statement was about 
the plaintiff; whether the defendant communicated the statement to a 
third person; whether the statement tended to harm the plaintiff s rep-
utation; and whether the defendant made the statement negligently 
or with actual malice. 
At the cause-in-fact stage the factfinder will decide, once again, if 
the plaintiff suffered actual injury or whether the defendant made the 
statements at issue with actual malice, in which case the plaintiff does 
not have to prove actual injury-the state may choose to presume in-
jury occurred. 2 08 Presuming an injury occurred presumes the state-
ment caused the injury. 
There is little activity at the legal cause stage in a private plain-
tiff/speech of public concern case for the reasons set forth in the public 
204. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 37.15, at 990. 
205. Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). 
206. Id. at 349. 
207. Id. 
208. At common law, damages in defamation cases were presumed. N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267 (1964). 
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official/public figure subsection. Finally, at damages, the factfinder 
values actual injury if it occurred or awards presumed and possible 
punitive damages if the plaintiff established the defendant acted with 
actual malice. 
C. Private Figure/Private Speech 
If alternatively, the plaintiff is not a public official/public figure and 
the speech is not about a matter of public concern, the state has the 
maximum power to articulate its own law of defamation, free of con-
stitutional restriction. In this type of case, with a private-figure plain-
tiff and speech which is not a matter of public concern, the plaintiff 
may recover, depending upon state law, if the defendant made the 
statement; the statement was about the plaintiff; the defendant com-
municated the statement to a third person; and the statement was de-
famatory. Arguably, in such a case, the state may be free to impose 
liability without fault. And it is clear that the state may award pre-
sumed and even punitive damages. The matters discussed in this par-
agraph define the relevant duty. At breach in this type of case, the 
factfinder makes the key factual determinations. 
Cause-in-fact, depending upon state law, may be perfunctory if the 
plaintiff chooses not to prove actual injury but instead seeks to recover 
only presumed damages. Legal cause is no different in the private/pri-
vate case than in the other cases; it is resolved as a legal matter and 
thus more behind the scenes. The law has once again cast a broad net 
of liability once the plaintiff establishes the necessary elements from 
a constitutional perspective and state tort law. Finally, the factfinder 
values actual injury if the plaintiff proves it and/or awards presumed 
damages. 
VII. INTENTIONAL TORTS 
Moving from defamation to the other nominate or intentional torts, 
the structure still applies. At common law, most of what we call inten-
tional torts 209 arose out of the writ of trespass, with its emphasis on 
direct causation. 21 0 Negligence arose later out of the writ of trespass on 
the case. 2 11 Historically, then, the development of many, indeed, most 
of the intentional torts one studies in law school predate the modern 
development of negligence, which is the basis for the articulated struc-
ture. To that extent, applying the model to intentional torts may be 
somewhat artificial. However, the trespass versus case historical real-
ity in common law is not present in the civil law. Consequently, if the 
209. Conversion is the exception. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, §§ 6, 15, at 
30, 89 (" [C]onversion had its real genesis in the old common law action of trover."). 
210. Id. § 6, at 29. 
211. Id. 
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model is truly comprehensive, it should apply to intentional torts. In 
this Section, the application of the structure to intentional torts is 
shown through its application to battery, although the structure would 
apply to all intentional torts. 
Battery is the intentional infliction of "[a] harmful or offensive con-
tact" with the person of another.212 What is the duty? What is the legal 
obligation or rule? It is to not intentionally inflict a contact with the 
person of another which is harmful or offensive to a reasonable person. 
The definition of battery is the law. It is the duty. It is a legal obligation 
just as much as the duty to exercise reasonable care, the duty not to 
make unreasonably dangerous products, or the duty not to engage in 
an ultrahazardous activity are legal obligations. What is intent, and 
how does the law define it? Again, that is a legal definition of a part of 
the duty or obligation, so it is a question for the court. What is a harm-
ful or offensive contact? Again, defining harmful or offensive is part of 
a duty question for the court. It is a statement of law. Of course, if the 
contact would not be harmful or offensive to a reasonable person but 
is harmful or offensive to the plaintiff because of some peculiar sensi-
bilities of which the defendant is aware, then the law holds the defend-
ant liable. This too is a statement of law about the legal obligation 
owed. The law is recognizing the particular sensibilities of the plaintiff 
in defining the extent of the obligation owed. 
In deciding if the defendant breached his duty not to batter, as de-
fined above, the factfinder determines whether the defendant did or did 
not comply with the applicable legal obligation. That decision would 
turn on the answers to several factual questions: did the defendant have 
intent? Was the contact with the person of another? Was the contact 
harmful or offensive? These are compliance questions, and, as such, they 
are breach questions. Cause-in-fact is often quite simple. Did the in-
tended contact occur? Did the defendant with intent to cause a contact 
that is harmful and offensive bring about that contact? 
As in defamation, there seems to be a muted, or more behind-the-
scenes role, for case-specific proximate cause decisions. This may be 
because with the common law of intentional torts arising from the writ 
of trespass, the writ required direct cause, so there was less need for 
an additional cause analysis. Notably, some of the rules dealing with 
transferred intent resemble legal cause or duty issues. If Z intends to 
hit A, but hits B, Z has battered B; the duty extends to her.213 Since 
transferred intent applies in such cases as a matter of law, the doctrine 
212. Id. § 9, at 39. One might be more precise and say that it is the intentional infliction 
of a contact with the person of another which is harmful or offensive to a reasonable person, 
but either way we are okay. For purposes of this analysis, I am treating consent as a de-
fense-which defendant must prove-instead of treating lack of consent as an element, 
which the plaintiff must prove. 
213. See, e.g., Morrow v. Flores, 225 S.W.2d 621, 624 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949). 
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is truly a duty doctrine. The duty not to batter one person extends to 
an unintended battery on another, 2 14 or put differently, the scope of 
liability extends to protect the unintended victim if there is an in-
tended victim. It is often said that the scope of liability resulting from 
an intentional wrong is broader or more far-reaching because of the 
defendant's scienter. 21 5 The extended liability of a trespasser for what 
the law calls continuing trespass is another example. 2 16 Whenever the 
liability is cut off in a particular case, as it sometimes is because of 
bizarreness, that is a legal cause decision. 
Another aspect of the liability extending principle which applies in 
intentional tort cases and also applies in all personal injury cases is 
the thin skull rule. The victim with peculiar sensibilities recovers all 
of her damages, even if unforeseeable, if what the defendant did would 
have been an actionable tort for the reasonable person.21 7 This is a mat-
ter of the extent of the legal obligation or duty. The duty extends to 
protect the thin skull plaintiff against what were unforeseeable inju-
ries caused by the physical impact for which the defendant is respon-
sible. Of course, the thin skull rule applies in all tort cases. 
Damages are often presumed in intentional tort cases. Most torts 
teachers begin their discussion of negligence, after having started off 
the torts course with intentional torts, and say, "now in negligence the 
plaintiff has to prove damage and that makes negligence different 
than the intentional torts." That is an overstatement. It is true that 
with negligence the plaintiff must prove an injury to a protected inter-
est. Is that to say that with intentional torts the plaintiff does not have 
to prove an injury to a protected interest or that the plaintiff does not 
suffer an injury to a legally protected interest? Not necessarily. 
If Popeye intentionally hits Bluto in the face, 2 18 and Bluto suffers a 
broken nose, a broken jaw, cannot work for two months, and suffers 
terrible pain, Bluto has suffered injury to his legal interests, and he 
may recover. Alternatively, if Popeye hits Bluto and he suffers no in-
jury other than just being hit, the law still allows him to recover. Thus, 
there is a difference between negligence and intentional torts. If Pop-
eye negligently impacts Bluto's person and causes absolutely no injury 
to Bluto, he cannot recover. 
However, the absence of physical injury or property damage in the 
Bluto battery example does not mean that Bluto suffered no injury. In 
214. Indeed, intent transfers amongst all of the intentional torts which arose out of the 
writ of trespass. Intent thus transfers from one person to another, one tort to another, and 
one tort to one person to a different tort to another. Id. § 8, at 37. 
215. See generally Caudle v. Betts, 512 So. 2d 389, 392 (La. 1987). 
216. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 13, at 83. 
217. Pitrev. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1161 (La. 1988); Caudle, 512 So. 2d 
at 392; Bartolone v. Jeckovich, 481 N.Y.S.2d 545, 547 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). 
218. Assume Popeye has no defenses. 
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battery cases, the law presumes that an intentionally inflicted harmful 
or offensive contact with the person of another always causes some in-
jury and the plaintiff just does not have to prove it. It is an injury to 
honor; it is an injury to the plaintiffs dignity. The existence of damage, 
if not the amount, is conclusively presumed. That presumption is really 
a statement of the legal obligation or duty. Historically, allowing recov-
ery of presumed damages in battery cases provided an incentive to 
plaintiffs to seek legal redress rather than take the law into their own 
hands and escalate matters. Given the volatile times in which we live, 
it seems the historical justification may still justify the rule. 
Interestingly, the damages discussion above raises some salient ob-
servations regarding cause-in-fact. Outside the area of intentional 
torts (and some remaining pockets of defamation), the plaintiff must 
show on a case-by-case basis that but for the defendant's noncompli-
ance with the applicable legal obligation, the plaintiff would not have 
suffered the particular damages for which it seeks recovery. With bat-
tery and other intentional torts, when only a dignitary injury is in-
volved the damage is presumed. Thus, but for causation is conclusively 
presumed. 21 9 The contact caused injury as a matter of law, so there is 
no need for further discussion or to confuse the jury by instructing on 
it, assuming there is no question that the contact occurred. 
However, the analysis is different if the plaintiff seeks to recover 
damages beyond dignitary injury resulting from the battery, other 
than the contact itself. That is, in my previous example with the bro-
ken nose, the broken jaw, the lost work, and the pain, the plaintiff 
should have to prove that the intentional contact brought about those 
injuries. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The previous several sections have applied the proposed structure 
to a variety of tort claims, other than negligence. They have estab-
lished that the structure applies to and helps bring an analytical con-
sistency to the torts discussed. In some areas, like defamation and in-
tentional torts, the legal cause analysis may be less extensive or ap-
parent than in other torts, but all of the elements of the structure ap-
ply to every tort. Moreover, applying the structure makes manifest 
that many issues that the law and scholars treat under breach, cause-
in-fact, legal cause, and damages are legal questions, not factual ques-
tions. For instance, the definition of the standard of care, the definition 
of an unreasonably dangerous product, or the obligation a speaker 
219. The same is true in a defamation case where the Constitution allows a state to 
award presumed damages. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 
763 (1985). 
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owes to a public official are not breach questions; they are legal ques-
tions. Moreover, by way of example, allowing recovery of lost chance 
of survival is not a causation decision; it is a redefinition of recover-
able damages, and hence a legal question. As the Legal Realists 
pointed out, many so-called proximate cause questions are really le-
gal and policy questions about the scope of the defendant's legal ob-
ligation. Not unlike lost chance of survival in cause-in-fact, recovery 
for wrongful death or for loss of consortium are not about damages 
per se; they are about whether the defendant's legal obligation makes 
it responsible for those losses to those plaintiffs. Because they are 
legal matters about the defendant's legal obligation, they are ulti-
mately duty questions. 
In conclusion, there is a unified structural model of torts which es-
sentially mirrors the elements of negligence-duty, breach, cause-in-
fact, legal cause, and damages. The model, if clearly understood and 
articulated by courts and commentators, would bring clarity to the 
law. It would bring greater coherence and would go a long way in aid-
ing lawyers and judges to consistently allocate decisionmaking respon-
sibility between judges and juries. Finally, the proposed structural 
model brings unity to an area of the law in which many judges, law-
yers, law professors, and students view as a potpourri of history, com-
mon law development, and social policy. The structural unity the 
model brings would force courts, lawyers, scholars, and reformers to 
focus on the real social and legal issues that underlie tort suits, rather 
than miring themselves in what may now appear to be a mishmash of 
claims whose commonality is that they all fall under the rubric of what 
we call torts. Finally, the model might help those trying to learn and 
understand the law to focus on what really matters-the core sub-
stance-instead of a twisting, turning labyrinth of confused concepts 
controlled by mythic beasts. 
